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ABSTRACT

This research is a framework for understanding issues in modeling the military
aspect of space, with particular regard to capturing its value. Space power is a difficult
and far-reaching topic, with implications that go beyond the military aspects. The United
States military increasingly relies on space-based systems and information for success in
daily operations. Telecommunications, navigation and timing, intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance, and weather prediction are instances of services that have become
dependent on satellite systems. If this reliance on space is not fully understood, U.S.
national security will be at risk as the result of space information degradation or denial.
This research effort attempts to break new ground in organizing the interactions and
interdependencies among space doctrine, space systems, system owner/operators, and
space-based information users. An illustrative example, using GPS, is then examined to
explore the approach. Analysis of GPS as it affects JDAM accuracy is modeled using the
GPS Interference And Navigation Tool (GIANT).
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ISSUES IN MODELING MILITARY SPACE

I. INTRODUCTION
General Issue
The United States, and the world in general, increasingly relies on space-based
systems. According to The Commission to Assess United States National Security Space
Management and Organization (aka, Space Commission), America’s interest in space
includes the following:
• Promote the peaceful use of space.
• Use the nation’s potential in space to support U.S. domestic, economic,
diplomatic, and national security objectives.
• Develop and deploy the means to deter and defend against hostile acts directed
at U.S. space assets and against the uses of space hostile to U.S. interests.
(Space Commission, 2, 7)
Domestic and economic applications of space include navigation and timing,
weather forecasting, geothermal imaging, pager and cellular service, television,
telephone, radio, and other forms of communications. In order to meet national security
objectives, deter foreign aggression, and defend U.S. interests, the military has more
specialized uses for satellites. These include those listed above, as well as a variety of
intelligence-gathering functions. These military space-based platforms provide our
national leaders with the capability to communicate with frontline forces from any point
on the globe, detect and investigate potential threats to allied forces or nations, pinpoint
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enemy assets for use in munitions targeting, support guidance of precision munitions, and
deter potential crises from affecting United States or allied national interests via
intelligence-gathering applications. As nations and citizens become more technologically
adept, space-based assets may develop more uses than planned for in their original
mission design. This expansion of uses results in an increased reliance by the military, as
well as society, on space-based technologies. As this reliance grows, so does our
vulnerability to attacks on these space-based systems.
As space products and services become ever more interwoven with our
nation’s politics, economics, culture, and security, they become an
increasingly lucrative target for potential adversaries. With such growing
dependence, a future foe could gain an advantage by denying, disrupting,
or destroying our ability to access and use space. (Long Range Plan, 19)
For example, the use of GPS has grown well beyond its original military
applications. GPS is used today to track packages, survey land, aid hikers and hunters in
land navigation, aid search and rescue personnel in locating lost or injured personnel, and
a variety of other commercial applications. Investment banks, cellular companies,
paging/computer networks, and electrical utilities also use GPS for time synchronization
(Klotz, 12). Banks with international branches must have time synchronization among
their widely dispersed locations to calculate interest and correctly handle various
transactions. Paging, cellular, and computer networks all use GPS-based time
synchronization to communicate electronically. The Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) uses GPS for its Terminal Doppler Weather Radar system as a reliable time source
(Houck, 1).
As society becomes increasingly reliant on space-based technology, questions
arise concerning our vulnerability to its loss; what happens if a specific technology is
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unavailable due to natural or man-made intervention? On March 13, 1989, the largest
solar flare in half a century caused a magnetic storm that destroyed a power transformer
in New Jersey and disabled the entire Hydro-Quebec electrical power grid for the
Province of Quebec, Canada, resulting in a blackout for the entire province (Thompson,
Reuters). This same storm also caused increased atmospheric drag in low-earth orbit
(LEO) resulting in USSPACECOM having to recompute trajectories for about 1,300
objects (Odenwald).
A similar solar storm on July 17, 2000 caused minor problems, including the
disruption of satellite data transfer, resulting in erroneous data from weather satellites
(GOES-8) (Reuters). A more recent geomagnetic storm in August 2001 interfered with
microwave communications, hand-held radiophones, and navigation systems in much of
Canada and the northern tier of the U.S. (Siegel, 1). The storm was so intense that the
Aurora Borealis could be seen as far south as El Paso, Texas. In addition, the recent
Leonid meteor shower in mid-November caused concern among astrophysicists that the
particles entering the near-earth environment might damage satellites (CNN, 1). Solar
flare radio noise, solar radiation, and solar flares are listed as potential environmental
impacts in the Joint Publications (Joint Pub IV-5).
Unfortunately, satellite disruption is not limited to natural events. Satellite
transmissions can be jammed or disrupted like other types of transmissions. A handheld
Russian GPS jamming device is powerful enough to disrupt an aircraft’s GPS receiver
out to 192 kilometers (Space Commission, Ch 2, 20). Jamming and natural space events
can have a tremendous affect on civilian and military satellite applications. Our
increasing dependence on space-based technology forces us to address the issue of the
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effects and potential problems if those assets became unavailable. For instance, how
would the way we wage war change if a space system (or systems) were degraded or lost
completely? To determine the military effectiveness of space, one must know what space
provides the warfighter and how, when, and where this information is used. This thesis
investigates issues in modeling military uses of space, with particular attention given to
how to begin measuring military effectiveness of space systems. It applies this method to
a nominal GPS system as an illustrative demonstration of the method.
Background
The Department of Defense (DOD) and various U.S. space agencies are
concerned with the potential vulnerabilities our nation’s reliance on space-based
platforms may create. The Space Commission’s report to Congress indicates the nation’s
reliance on space assets could potentially lead to a “Space Pearl Harbor” situation (Space
Commission, Executive Summary, viii). “We know from history that every medium—
air, land, and sea—has seen conflict. Reality indicates that space will be no different”
(Space Commission, Executive Summary, x). In a series of essays about the future of the
Chinese military, written by high-ranking Chinese military authorities, space is clearly a
new dimension in the battlefield. In fact, many Chinese military leaders support the view
that future conflicts in space are inevitable and are preparing to meet that reality
(Pillsbury, Part 4). Similarly, the Space Commission also states it is vital to national
security to protect and defend the U.S. and its space assets from hostile action either from
space or terrestrial forces (Space Commission, Executive Summary, vii).
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In March 2000, General Eberhart, Commander in Chief, North American
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD); Commander in Chief, U.S. Space Command
(USSPACECOM); and Commander, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), described
how the failure of one of four MilStar II satellites resulted in a 25% degradation in global
tactical satellite secure communications capability (Eberhart, 13). This loss during a time
of peace caused limited difficulties in tactical communications. However, in times of
conflict or during critical military operations, this type of loss could be a crucial
impediment to mission success and put lives at risk.
The ability to restrict or deny freedom of access to and operations in space
is no longer limited to global military powers. Knowledge of space
systems and the means to counter them is increasingly available on the
international market. Nations hostile to the U.S. possess or can acquire the
means to disrupt or destroy U.S. space systems by attacking the satellites
in space, their communications nodes on the ground and in space, or
ground nodes that command the satellites. (Space Commission, 2, 19)
Identifying the critical space technologies the Air Force requires to complete its mission
is a necessary first step. It is important to develop a methodology that can explain the
extent of our dependence on these space assets.
In the coming period, the U.S. will conduct operations to, from, in, and through
space in support of its national interests both on earth and in space. As with
national capabilities in the air, on land, and at sea, the U.S. must have the
capabilities to defend its space assets against hostile acts and to negate the hostile
use of space against U.S. interests. (Space Commission, 2, 13)
CIA Director George Tenet stated in his February 6, 2002 testimony to Congress that
longstanding U.S. advantages in space surveillance “are eroding as more countries,
including China and India, field increasingly sophisticated reconnaissance satellites”
(Walter, 3). Awareness of these diminishing advantages, increasing interdependencies,
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and an ability to measure our vulnerability is necessary while we improve methods to
protect these space assets.
Air Force Space Command is concerned about the ability to quantify the impact
of space on warfare and the warfighter. Some key questions that need to be addressed for
establishing the military effectiveness of space are:
• What synergistic effects do satellites provide to mission accomplishment and
how are these force-multipliers measured?
• Does the loss or degradation of space assets affect putting bombs on target?
• How do we measure damage and degradation in performance of satellites?
• At what point does satellite degradation start affecting mission effectiveness?
• At what points in the peace, pre-conflict, conflict, return-to-peace process is
space critical? (Whitsel, 2001)
With respect to conventional operations, battle damage assessment (BDA) is well
established, even though it may require satellite inputs and verification. However, with
respect to information and satellite operations, our assessment of damage to a
communications network of an enemy or allied intelligence satellite is less established.
This is due to the nature of the space environment. It is relatively easy to assess damage
done to a tank on the battlefield or determine the cause of its failure. However, when a
space system fails or stops communicating, the current inaccessibility of space systems
makes traditional BDA difficult. Telemetry data or radio emissions are typically more
helpful in determining the cause of a failure.
Modeling can aide in the study of system failures or normal operations. There are
two ways to study the operations and interactions of a system: experiment with the actual
system or experiment with a model of the system (Law and Kelton, 4). Since spacelift
6

systems and payloads are extremely expensive, a methodology is required to imitate and
experiment with a space-based system. A clear indication that simulation can be useful
in determining what space brings to the fight is the following citation from the Space
Commission.
The military uses a variety of tools to simulate war-fighting environments
in support of exercises, experiments, and war games. However, these tools
have not been modernized to take into account the missions and tasks that
space systems can perform. As a result, simulation tools cannot be used
effectively to understand the utility of space-based capabilities on warfare.
Further, the lack of modeling and simulation tools has prevented military
commanders from learning how to cope with the loss or temporary
interruption of key space capabilities, such as the Global Positioning
System (GPS), satellite communications, remote sensing, or missile
warning information. To support exercises, experiments and war games,
the Department must develop and employ modeling and simulation tools
based on measures of merit and effectiveness that will quantify the effects
of space-based capabilities. (Space Commission, xxix)
Not only is modeling and simulation useful, it is required according to
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD). PDD-NSC-49/NSTC-8, National Space Policy,
as implemented by Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3100.10, Space Policy,
July 1999, which states:
Space capabilities and applications shall be integrated into campaign-level
and other models and simulations. Models and simulations shall focus on
demonstrating the military worth and other value of both friendly and
adversary space capabilities and applications to mission accomplishment.
(Space Policy, 12)
Understanding and organizing doctrine and mission functionality of our various
space-based systems, what they do, and how they interact is necessary to accurately
model these systems.
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Problem Statement
The purpose of this thesis is to take an initial step in clarifying issues in modeling
the military effectiveness of space. This first step involves a review of available opensource literature in order to determine the current state of the art in modeling space assets.
This requires a review of how space is handled in various combat models and
simulations. The next step is the development of a general form of measuring the
effectiveness of a system. This methodology is then applied to a nominal GPS example
to determine its validity.
Research Approach
The research objective of this thesis was to develop an initial methodology
AFSPC can use to aid in modeling the military effectiveness of space. To do this, the
influences and interactions of the space systems, the command and control structures, and
the end users of the information these systems provide must be understood. Current
capabilities in the modeling and simulation of space systems also must be evaluated. An
understanding of the various primary, secondary, tertiary, and other dimensional
interactions is essential for modeling the various space systems.
A hierarchy was developed of the various responsibilities space systems have on
the Air Force mission. These mission responsibilities are then further reduced to analyze
actual system functions using modeling and simulation. We apply our methodology to
catalogue space assets’ various missions, functions, and interactions. Additionally, our
approach will help identify the customers using these systems, the purpose of the system,
and a determination of the military worth.
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Scope/Limitations
This research will look at the interactions between a space system’s
functionality and its mission requirements using open-source data. The analysis
of the particular space system (GPS) is notional since it is based on open-source
information and limited to an unclassified level. GPS has an important mission
and provides key functionality to the warfighter. This example will provide an
understanding of how space systems influence the military mission—a key step
toward defining the system’s military worth.
Outline of Thesis
In Chapter II, a review of relevant literature with respect to space systems,
doctrine, responsibility matrices, and project management is presented. In
Chapter III, a coherent methodology is developed for understanding how the
functionality and mission requirements of space systems interact. In Chapter IV,
an application of the methodology using the GPS system and its relation to the
warfighter is presented. The thesis concludes with a recommendation for future
related research projects.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
This chapter reviews open-source literature dealing with international law, U.S.
policy, Department of Defense and Air Force doctrine, long-range planning, space
operations and systems, and project management. The purpose of this chapter is to gain
an understanding, at the open-source level, about the mission and functionality of spacebased systems, how they are used, how they interact, and what limitations exist.
International Law
To establish the military worth of space, the current limits on the military use of
space must be understood. International law, international treaties, and national policy
place limits on military uses of space. Prohibited activities include: nuclear weapon
testing in space, the delivery of weapons of mass destruction from space, and offensive
operations from space. These documents also prohibit claims of sovereignty by a nation
on any celestial body or extraterrestrial territory. Table 1, taken from the Air Force
Space Handbook, highlights the key areas in international law or treaties limiting the
military use of space. The U.S. maintains the right to carry out actions in space not
directly prohibited by these agreements and treaties.
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Table 1. International Agreements that Limit Military Activities in Space
Agreement
United
Nations
Charter (1947)
Limited Test
Ban Treaty
(1963)
Outer Space
Treaty (1967)

Antiballistic
Missile
(ABM) Treaty
(1972)
Dec 13, 2001
U.S. withdraw
from the ABM
Treaty (Bush)
Liability
Convention
(1972)
Convention on
Registration
(1974)
Environmental
Modification
Convention
(1980)

Principle/Constraint
- Made applicable to Space by the Outer Space Treaty of 1967
- Prohibits states from threatening to use, or actually using, force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of another state (Article 2(4))
- Recognizes a state’s inherent right to act in individual or collective self-defense when attacked.
- Bans nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater.
- States may not conduct nuclear weapon tests or other nuclear explosions (i.e., peaceful nuclear
explosions) in outer space or assist or encourage others to conduct such tests or explosions
(Article 1).
- Outer space and celestial bodies are not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty,
use, occupation, or other means (Article 11).
- Space activities shall be conducted in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter
(Article III).
- The Moon and other celestial bodies are to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes (Article IV)
and free for use by all states (Article 1).
- Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (such as chemical and biological
weapons) may not be placed in orbit, installed on celestial bodies, or stationed in space in any
other manner (Article IV).
- A state may not conduct military maneuvers: establish military bases, fortifications, or
installations; or test any type of weapon on celestial bodies. Use of military personnel for
scientific research or other peaceful purpose is permitted (Article IV).
- States are responsible for governmental and private space activities, and must supervise and
regulate private activities (Article IV).
- States are internationally liable for damage to another state (and its Citizens) caused by its space
objects (including privately owned ones) (Article VII).
- States retain jurisdiction and control over space objects while they are in space or on celestial
bodies (Article VII).
- States must conduct international consultations before proceeding with activities that would cause
potentially harmful interference with activities of other parties (Article IX).
- States must carry out their use and exploration of space in such a way as to avoid harmful
contamination of outer space, the Moon, and other celestial bodies, as well as to avoid the
introduction of extraterrestrial matter that could adversely affect the environment of the Earth
(Article IX).
- Stations, installations, equipment, and space vehicles on the Moon and other celestial bodies are
open to inspection by other countries on a basis of reciprocity (Article XII).
- Between the US and USSR.
- Prohibits development, testing, or deployment of space-based ABNI systems or components
(Article V).
- Prohibits deployment of ABM systems or components except as authorized in the treaty (Article
I).
- Prohibits interference with the national technical means a party uses to verify compliance with the
treaty (Article XII).

- A launching site is absolutely liable for damage by its space object to people or property on the
Earth or in its atmosphere (Article II).
- Liability for damage caused by a space object, to persons or property on board such a space
object, is determined by fault (Article III).
- Requires a party to maintain a registry of objects it launches into Earth orbit or beyond (Article II).
- Information of each registered object must be furnished to the UN as soon as practical, including
basic orbital parameters and general function of the object (Article IV).
- Prohibits military or other hostile use of environmental modification techniques as a means of
destruction, damage, or injury to any other state if such use has widespread, long-lasting, or severe
effects (Article I).
Source: Space Handbook, Vol. I, 55
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These limitations are specific and still allow for a broad use of space. By not
expressly denying its use in space, “international law implicitly permits the performance
of traditional military functions as surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, meteorology,
and communications” (Space Handbook I, 57). Activities that are permitted include
nonnuclear, non-ABM, conventional space-to-ground weapons and anti-satellite
weapons. These uses of space by the military may be limited by U.S. national policy
objectives, however. “Currently, there are no force application assets operating in space,
but technology and national policy could change so that force application missions could
be performed from platforms operating in space” (AFDD 2-2, 19).
The recent withdrawal by the United States from the 1972 ABM Treaty illustrates
how national policy can change with respect to the military uses of space. Based on
openly available information, no force application assets for any nation are currently
operating in space.
National Space Policy
In 2000, Congress created the Space Commission. The Space Commission’s
charter was to assess the (Space Commission, Ch 1, 2):
• Exploitation of military space assets to support U.S. operations.
• Interagency coordination of national security space assets.
• Professional military education institutions’ role in military space issues.
• The potential costs and benefits of:
o Merging intelligence and non-intelligence aspects of national security space.
o An independent national security space mission department and military
service.
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o A national security space mission corps within the Air Force.
o A position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space.
o A new program or budget mechanism to manage national security space.
o Any other change to existing DOD organizational structure for national
security space management and organization.
Congress amended the Space Commission’s charter in 2001, to include the following
additional elements (Space Commission, 1, 2):
• Flag officers must have space, missile, or information operations experience.
• CINC SPACECOM must be rotated among the services.
• Removal of flight rating requirement for key officer positions.
These tasks form a comprehensive and far reaching understanding into how space is and
should be used, organized, and managed by the Department of Defense, intelligence
communities, civilian, and commercial organizations. Prior to the Space Commission,
the arrangement and management of space did not provide a clear and focused attention
to space (Space Commission, 2, 9). The Space Commission recommended several
changes in the space organizational structure giving space a cabinet-level voice, clearer
accountability, and responsibility. The result of the Space Commission study is a greater
emphasis on the role space has in national security. In addition, the Space Commission
recommended (Space Commission, 6, 90):
• Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) should be assigned responsibility for
providing the resources to execute space research, development, acquisition,
and operations, under the command of a four-star general. The Army and Navy
would still establish requirements and develop and deploy space systems
unique to each service.
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• Amend Title 10 U.S.C. to assign the Air Force responsibility to organize, train,
and equip for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air and space
operations. In addition, the Secretary of Defense should designate the Air
Force as Executive Agent for Space within the Department of Defense.
The recent promotion and subsequent reassignment of General Lance Lord as
Commander of AFSPC, together with the realignment of the Space and Missile Systems
Center (SMC) from Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) to AFSPC, provides a clear
indication that the Space Commission’s recommendations are being implemented.
Other important policy and planning documents include: the National Security
Space Master Plan, DOD Space Policy, Joint Vision 2020, USSPACECOM Long Range
Plan, and the AFSPC Strategic Master Plan.
Military Doctrine
Where policy is a plan or a course of action, “doctrine is a tool to translate
national policy into military forces and employment strategy” (Newberry, 3). Table 2
highlights several differences between policy and doctrine. Table 2 clearly demonstrates
the emphasis of doctrine on military effectiveness or worth.

Table 2. Policy versus Doctrine
Item
Source
Emphasis
Responsiveness
Duration

Policy
Civilian Authorities
Politically Derived
Quick
Short

Doctrine
Military Leadership
Military Effectiveness
Slow, Incremental
Long
Source: Newberry, 9

Joint doctrine is a necessary capstone requirement before any service-level
doctrine can be established (Newberry, 5). However, in the absence of Joint doctrine on
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space, the Air Force developed Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-2, Space
Operations, in 1998. This was the first space doctrine developed in the seven years since
Air Force Manual 1-6, Military Space Doctrine, was rescinded in 1991. Joint doctrine
for space during this time was non-existent until publication of a draft of Joint
Publication 3-14, Joint Doctrine: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Space
Operations, in 1999. Without an officially approved joint doctrine, the military worth of
space becomes less tangible and more difficult to assess.
Joint Pub 3-14 is currently under development by USSPACECOM. In its first
draft, version dated January 1999, the space doctrine focus is on four mission areas: space
control, force application, space support, and force enhancement (Joint Pub 3-14, vi).
The space control mission is composed of three functional areas: protection,
prevention, and negation. Protection consists of both active and passive defensive
measures to safeguard space-based assets from natural or man-made interference.
Prevention is a form of deterrence through economic, diplomatic, or political means to
avoid a hostile nation’s use of space-based systems. Negation refers to measures to
deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy an enemy’s space systems and services (Joint
Pub 3-14, III-5).
Force application and space control, together, account for combat operations in
space. Force application is the true offensive role in space and involves the employment
of weapons targeting air, land, sea, or other space forces. Current national policy
constrains the use of force from space. Future force application functions may consist of
power projection, terrestrial defense, and ballistic missile defense (BMD) (Joint Pub 314, III-12, GL-8).
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Space support represents the logistical footprint required to operate space
systems. Spacelift/launch, satellite operations (telemetry, tracking, & commanding or
TT&C), and space surveillance are the functional areas of space support (Joint Pub, III11). Spacelift and launch refer to operations associated with delivering a system into
orbit. TT&C refers to the actual control of a system while it is in orbit. Space
surveillance is a support function for tracking, identifying, and cataloging any and all
items in orbit in support of launch operations (Joint Pub 3-14, III-11). This important
function is used to support the placement of future systems into orbit, identify potential
threats, and avoid collision with existing systems or space debris (Joint Pub 3-14, III- 4).
The Force enhancement mission is a combat support mission. The various
functional areas provide situational awareness to the warfighter. Because of this
situational awareness, the force enhancement mission has the most direct impact on the
warfighter (Joint Pub 3-14, III- 8). The functional areas for force enhancement are:
surveillance and reconnaissance, environmental monitoring, communications,
imagery/global geospatial information and services, and navigation and timing.
Surveillance and reconnaissance provides the combatant commander intelligence
on troop disposition, location, and intention. Surveillance and reconnaissance also
provides early attack warning, targeting analysis, BDA, and COA opportunities (Joint
Pub 3-14, App A). This allows the commander a greater variety of options when
employing forces; e.g., tactics can be selected to give friendly forces a great advantage
(Joint Pub 3-14, App A).
Environmental monitoring provides commanders with meteorological,
oceanographic, and space environmental data. Weather forecast data is useful for
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mission planning, targeting and weapon selection, timing, BDA and communications.
Oceanographic data provides surface commanders with surface condition, swell height,
depth, and water current information (Joint Pub 3-14, App B).
Communications are essential for command and control of forces in wartime and
peacetime operations. With increased reliance on technologically advanced weapons,
data transfer requirements will only increase. Video and audio communications provide
necessary information to warfighters and mission planners. Satellite communications
provide quick and secure communications at all levels of command from troops in the
field to the combatant commander to the President and Secretary of Defense National
Command Authority (Joint Pub 3-14, App C).
Imagery/global geospatial information and services provide “information on
terrain, surface trafficability, oceanic subsurface conditions, beach conditions, and
vegetation” (Joint Pub 3-14, App D). With this information, mission planners can
identify specific avenues of approach, ingress/egress routes, and other mission
requirements.
Navigation and timing provide very accurate three-dimensional location, velocity,
and timing information to the warfighter. This is essential for today’s precision-guided
munitions and weapon systems.
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Figure 1. Space Mission and Functional Elements

Figure 1 graphically represents the mission and functional elements of space
according to draft Joint Publication 3-14. These military uses of space fulfill basic
information collection processes that were once only gathered by spies or scout troops.
This information is required to successfully plan military operations. Sun Tzu wrote,
“Know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered. Know the
ground, know the weather; your victory will then be total” (Huang, 13). Joint space
doctrine is organized to aid in the collection and identification of this type of information
to help carry out operational missions.
According to Joint Publication 3-14, USSPACECOM is the “single military
organization responsible for military space operations” (Joint Pub 3-14, vi). As such,
USSPACECOM’s mission as a unified combatant command is to coordinate the use of
space control, force application, space support, force enhancement, computer network
defense, and computer network attack among the Army, Navy, and Air Force Space
Commands. The first four missions are identical to the missions directed under Joint
Publication 3-14. The two additional mission areas deal with the defense of and attack on

18

information, computers, and networks in terms of disruption, denial, degradation, or
destruction.
AFSPC is the Air Force’s major command responsible for providing trained space
forces to USSPACECOM, and trained ICBM forces to the U.S. Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM). As the Executive Agent for Space, the AFSPC mission is to defend
the United States through the control and exploitation of space. This mission is further
divided into the four areas of space control, force application, space support, and force
enhancement. While CINC USSPACECOM has also filled the role as CINC NORAD
and AFSPC/CC, the Space Commission recommends discontinuing this practice. By
separating AFSPC from USSPACECOM, CINC USSPACECOM can focus on long-term
joint space issues and divorce himself from nearer term AFSPC issues (Space
Commission, 6, 89).
Service-level doctrine should be more operational in scope than joint doctrine.
“Space systems and capabilities enhance the precision, lethality, survivability, and agility
of all operations—air, land, sea, and special operations” (AFDD 2-2, 3). These
operational enhancement functions are similar to those assigned for airpower. The four
functional areas listed in AFDD 2-2, are space control, application of force, enhancing
operations, and supporting space forces. These areas directly correspond to those
functions mentioned in joint doctrine. Some nominal operational power capabilities
provided by space operations are depicted in Table 3.
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Table 3. Nominal Space Capabilities
Space Control
Provide a space
order of battle
Detect attack and
provide warning
to space forces
Defend against
attack against
space forces
Detect, report, and
track ballistic
missile launches
Disrupt, Deny,
degrade, and
destroy adversary
space surveillance
capabilities
Deny Adversary
access to US/
allied space
systems
Deceive, disrupt,
deny, degrade, or
destroy space
platforms,
payloads, sensors,
links, launch
facilities, satellite
control, or
information
distribution
centers as required
by CINCs

Surveillance/
Reconnaissance
Detect artificial
disturbances (e.g.,
buried facilities,
construction sites,
etc.)
Locate presurveyed missile
launch locations
Provide route and
target information
for mission
planning
Detect camouflage
(artificial soft
disturbances)

Enhancing Operations
Environmental
Navigation
Sensing
Provide common
Provide data for
navigation grid
radiation fallout
patterns, intensity,
Provide common
and aerosol
timing references
dispersion
Provide position,
location, velocity
for weapon
accuracy, and
ingress and egress
Provide position,
location, time for
navigation, and
silent rendezvous
coordination

Provide wind and
cloud temperature,
and atmospheric
moisture data in
enemy area for
weapon selection
Monitor
ionospheric
disturbances and
weather conditions
which affect C4I

Assess enemy
movements,
operations

Provide weather
data over route
and target

Provide warning of
hostile acts and
reconnaissance
against US assets

Provide soil
moisture, location
of ice flows,
precipitation,
temperature, and
snow cover data
for trafficability

Detect, track,
assess, and report
air-breathing
threats

Deploy decoys,
on-orbit spares,
and residual
capabilities as
required to
support military
operations

Provide raw data
to assessment
centers

Theater Missile
Warning
Detect, report,
and track
ballistic missile
launches

Provide assessed
information to
key decision
makers
Provide warning
to forces
Provide secure,
survivable
communications
Provide taskings
to forces
Provide
intertheater and
intratheater
communications

Provide
multispectral
imagery data for
maps and analysis

Detect, assess, and
report nuclear
detonations

Communication

Provide assessed
information and
data to forces
Provide timely
situational
awareness and
location
information to
forces
Provide status of
forces

Monitor solar
wind and
magnetic fields
Determine when
scintillation of US
communication
systems might
occur

Source: AFDD 2-2, Appendix A
These space capabilities are employed throughout peacetime, escalation, conflict,
and post hostilities (AFDD 2-2, 29). Figure 2 reflects how the realm of information
superiority is integrated into the peace-war-peace cycle.
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Figure 2. Space Employment Concepts

Space assets provide a significant proportion of the military’s current information
superiority capabilities via the mission functions already mentioned. The information
provided by space is critical to decision makers and can provide global awareness and
possibly diplomatic or political advantage that allows us to effectively respond to crises
(AFDD 2-2, 29). This adds a dimension of time into the worth of space. Space provides
both long-term and short-term benefits. Satellite imagery is crucial to both mission
planning and execution. Intelligence gathering of possible future targets is a critical longterm role filled by space systems. Imagery of post-strike targets (BDA) is a critical shortterm role by space systems.
Modeling and Simulation
In order to effectively model the military aspects of space, the interaction of space
systems and their components, the performance of these components, and the users of
these space systems must to be studied. Figure 3 illustrates various ways a system may
be studied (Law & Kelton, 4). Modeling and simulation provides a capability for
studying these interactions.
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The first choice is to decide to experiment with the actual system or with a model
of that system. A major factor in this decision is if it is cost-effective to modify the
actual system (Law, 4). Another key factor is that in some cases, there is no real way
(short of war) to test some systems. For example, for modifications to an existing
airframe, it may be relatively simple to modify the airframe and test during flight-testing.
However, if a new aircraft design is proposed, modeling the airframe in a wind tunnel
first as an alternative to building a new aircraft and flight-testing it.

System

Experiment
with the
actual system

Experiment
with a model
of the system

Physical
model

Mathematical
model

Analytical
solution

Simulation

Source: Law, Figure 1.1

Figure 3. Ways to Study a System

The next choice is whether a physical model or mathematical model is required.
A physical model is one in which a scaled replica of the system of interest is created and
studied. A mathematical model represents a system by logical or quantitative measures
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that can be altered and studied (Law, 5). To study the aerodynamics of an aircraft, a
small-scale model in a wind tunnel may be sufficient. To study the astrodynamics of a
spacecraft, a mathematical model incorporating orbital mechanics may be more valid.
Finally, an analytic solution or simulation solution should be obtained. An
analytic solution can be obtained through calculation of the mathematical model.
If not all variables are known or the problem is too complex for an analytic
solution, simulation can be employed to numerically exercise the mathematical model
(Law, 5). Figure 4 illustrates a series of steps that must be applied in order to have a
sound simulation study. A description of these steps is found in Appendix A.
1

Formulate problem
and plan the study

2

Collect data and
define a model

3

Conceptual
model valid?

No

Yes
4

Construct a computer
program and verify

5

Make pilot runs

6

Programmed
model valid?

No

Yes
7

Design Experiments

8

Make production
runs

9

Analyze output
data

10

Document, present,
and use results

Source: Law, Figure 1.68

Figure 4. Steps in a Simulation Study
23

The use of modeling and simulation is well established within the DOD
community. There are several levels of simulation in the area of combat modeling, as
shown in Figure 5. System- or engineering-level models found at the base of the pyramid
model the individual characteristics of a system. Engagement-level models attempt to
assess a system’s performance (e.g., probability of kill) against an adversary system in a
“one on one” engagement. Mission-level models are “one vs. many” or “many vs. many”
battle models that attempt to measure the operational performance of the system(s).
Theater or campaign models attempt to represent the entire military operations of a war
including ground, sea, and air components.

Military Utility (Added value)
Campaign
THUNDER CEM
CFAM JWARS CTEM
LCOM TacWar MASS
SUPPRESSOR
SWEG EADSIM GDAS
FASTALS MOBCEM BIOSTRIKE

Increasing
Aggregation

TRAP

BRAWLER COSAGE
SHAZAM
MIL-AASPEM 2
JSEM
TEAM
ESAMS
MOSAIC GTSIMS RADGUNS

HUNDREDS OF ENGINEERING MODELS

Figure 5. Model Hierarchy
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Higher
Resolution

Mission

Engagement

According to Presidential Decision Directive NSC-49, modeling is the approved
method to demonstrate the effectiveness of a space system. It will be important to
determine how space is currently modeled (PDD-NSC-49/NSTC-8). There are too many
models in existence to review in detail in this research. Therefore, the major Theaterlevel models are reviewed. The first model, the Integrated Theater Engagement Model
(ITEM), simulates warfare across a wide spectrum of conflict from the individual unit
level to a major regional conflict. The second model, Tactical Warfare (TACWAR), is a
Joint model used to simulate 2 sided theater level combat. THUNDER is a stochastic,
two-sided, analytical simulation of campaign-level military operations sponsored by the
Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency (AFSAA) and currently is the primary Air Force
tool for evaluating the contributions of air and space systems (AFMSRR). Strategic and
Theater Operations Research Model (STORM) is the replacement to Thunder. The
Extended Air Defense Simulation (EADSIM) assesses the effectiveness of Theater
Missile Defense (TMD) and air defense systems against the full spectrum of extended air
defense threats (SMDC). The final model reviewed is a new model being developed, the
Joint Warfare System (JWARS), is based in joint doctrine and will be capable of
representing future warfare; and aid in force structure analysis, acquisition analysis, and
CINC course of action analysis (JWARS). Table 4 displays how each of these models
represent the various space missions within the simulation. In addition, Appendix B
provides a review of simulations that model the various Space, Missile Warning, and/or
Information Operation functions.
The System Effectiveness Analysis Simulation (SEAS) is an entity-based, timestepped, stochastic, multimission-level model designed to help evaluate the military
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utility of airborne and space-based communications and ISR assets (Rand, 53). This high
fidelity model represents the specific mission level requirements of airborne and space
based communications and ISR. Target Prioritization for Links & Nodes (TPT-LN)
{Formerly SIAM) analyzes information flow on the battlefield to determine effects-based
target priorities and information degradation from weapon use. (Aegis). It models a
series of networks consisting of sensors and shooters and the paths that connect them. In
contrast to the theater level models displayed in Table 4, these high fidelity models
represent a specific aspect of space relatively well. Space is not well represented among
the theater level models as is evident by Table 4. However, space is well represented in
the various system level models listed in Appendix B.
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F. Mapping
II. Force Application
A. Ballistic Missile
Defense
B. Power Projection
C. Air, Land, and Sea
Defense
III. Space Control
A. Prevention
(Space Surveillance)
B. Protection
C. Negation
IV. Space Support
A. Satellite Control
B. Logistics of Systems
C. Spacelift

E. Warning

Implicit, Intra-theater comm. Handled explicitly
for IADS and ground forces; implicitly for ATOs
and other military comm.
Explicit navigation satellites and orbits affect airto-surface weapon lethality based upon the DOP
caused by the number of satellites available.
Forecasts of satellite availability schedule affect
weaponeering in deliberate ATO planning
Explicit representation of EO, IR, Radar, and
SIGINT collection and dynamic collection
planning. Explicit sensor footprint modeled
Weather forecasting affects input via weather
forecast file affecting ATO planning. Terrestrial
weather explicitly limits space sensors (if
appropriate). Space weather (flares, ion storms,
etc.) effects captured through satellite blackouts.
Explicit DSP and SBIR model for detection of
TBM events and curing for dynamic tasking of
attack operations and launch warnings on airfield
operations

Perfect connectivity assumed unless
otherwise scripted

Not Represented

Not Represented

Not Represented

Not Represented

Not Represented

Not Represented

Satellite pass generation
Not Represented
Impacts captured through scripted satellite
blackouts

Impacts captured through scripted satellite
blackouts

Not Represented

Explicit, Terrestrial defenses engage incoming
threats

Terrestrial defenses engage
incoming threats

Explicitly defined TBM and active air
defenses engage incoming threats

Not Represented

Not Represented

Assumed perfect unless otherwise scripted

Effects of GPS played through
SABSEL Pks for GPS weapons;
User scripts GPS problems

How model represents space

THUNDER

How model represents space

TACWAR

Early warning and Ground
controlled intercept (EW/CGI)
sites provide warning of
attacks based on probability of
detection
Not Represented

Not Represented

Emitter and Sensor Types and
Sensor coverage area modeled
as objects

C. Intelligence and
Surveillance

D. Environmental
Monitoring

Not Represented

How model represents space

ITEM

B. Navigation and
Positioning

I. Missions
A. Functions
I. Force Enhancement
A. Communications

Table 4. Space Power in Theater Level Models
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B. Power Projection
C. Air, Land, and Sea
Defense
III. Space Control
A. Prevention
(Space Surveillance)
B. Protection
C. Negation
IV. Space Support
A. Satellite Control
B. Logistics of
Systems
C. Spacelift

F. Mapping
II. Force Application
A. Ballistic Missile
Defense

E. Warning

D. Environmental
Monitoring

C. Intelligence and
Surveillance

B. Navigation and
Positioning

I. Missions
A. Functions
I. Force
Enhancement
A. Communications

Launch is not modeled but space vehicles can
be added in time-phased manner

Satellite available or not available
Not Represented

Not Represented (Damage or destruction of
ground stations is modeled)

Impacts captured through scripted satellite blackouts

Not Represented

Not Represented

Impacts captured through scripted satellite blackouts

Not Represented

Space-to-surface capability is captured through scripting of
interactions

DSP modeled as independent satellite
detection, weather effects sensors uniformly,
regardless of location

Not Represented

Not Represented

Not Represented

Not Represented

ISR sensors are user-selectable for any
combination of platform and sensor types.
Three platform types exist, EO/IR, Radar, &
SIGINT
Space Environment not represented, terrestrial
weather is modeled but not based on space
system provided data

Weather forecasting affects input via weather forecast file
affecting ATO planning. Terrestrial weather explicitly
limits space sensors (if appropriate). Space weather (flares,
ion storms, etc.) effects captured through satellite blackouts.
Explicit DSP and SBIR model for detection of TBM events
and curing for dynamic tasking of attack operations

Explicit comm. satellite and orbit representation. Dynamic
campaign effects selected based upon comm. resource
(orbital & surface) availability and campaign state.
Explicit navigation satellites and orbits affect air-to-surface
weapon lethality based upon the DOP caused by the number
of satellites available. Forecasts of satellite availability
schedule affect weaponeering in deliberate ATO planning
Explicit representation of EO, IR, Radar, and SIGINT
collection and dynamic collection planning. Explicit sensor
footprint modeled

Not Represented but Satellite communications
data input from DISA’s NETWARE model

Not Represented

How model represents space

STORM (THUNDER replacement)

How model represents space

JWARS (replaces TACWAR,
THUNDER, CEM, & ITEM)

Table 4. Space Power in Theater Level Models Continued

Source: Modified from Payne, 2-10 to 2-13

Not Represented

Not Represented

Not Represented
Space-based intelligence assets target and
engage TBM launchers (TELs)

Ground, Air, and spaced-based units target
and engage threat missiles

Warning information provided to defensive,
offensive, and reconnaissance forces to
engage threats
Not Represented

Explicit satellites, aircraft and ground units
provide surveillance and intelligence data to
offensive and defensive units to engage
threats
Not Represented

Not Represented

Models each message from generation to
transmission and associated delays

How model represents space

EADSIM

What is lacking is an understanding of how to aggregate these system level
models represented in Appendix B into relevant theater and global level effects for use in
lower fidelity models. Figure 6 visually portrays this lack of intermediate level of
representation of space in modeling. A way of organizing the relevant mission details
and effects of a space system into several levels of fidelity is required.

Modeling Level
Global
Campaign
Theater
Mission
System

Fidelity
Low

MOE
Non-existent

Requires Aggregation

High

Well defined

Figure 6. Fidelity Issues in Space Modeling

GPS Interference and Navigation Tool (GIANT)
“GIANT is a one versus many constructive and repeatable simulation used to
determine GPS and Inertial Navigation System (INS) performance and weapon system
operational effectiveness as a function thereof in a GPS interference environment”
(Veridian, 1). GIANT was conceived and developed for the GPS Joint Program Office
Navwar Program (Veridian, 5). GIANT is controlled and operated by the Space and
Missile Systems Center at Los Angeles AFB, California. GIANT is capable of
representing air and ground vehicles with or without weapons. Both the launcher and the
weapon have GPS/INS navigation systems and the launcher to weapon handoff event is
modeled (Veridian, 3). As an option, any number probability of kill is thus traceable to
the weapon and the launcher (McLagan, 5). GIANT is a validated and accredited model
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and is included in the Air Force Systems Analysis Toolkit (AFSAT).of stationary or
moving GPS jammers can be present. Target miss distance and
Project Management
Project Management is a process in which a structured, detailed planning, and
implementation strategy is incorporated for obtaining an organization goal or goals
(Nicholas, 19). The U.S. military uses project management in the acquisition process of
new systems. “It (Project Management) is often associated with early missile and space
programs of the 1960s” (Nicholas, 24). In procuring or developing a new system there
are many different processes that are taking place. Managers must employ a strategy to
control the performance of a diverse group of people and skills required in order to
complete a project on time and within an allotted budget (Milton, 15-19). This is
displayed in a relatively simple graph in Figure 7.

Cost

Target

Performance
Time

Source: Rosenau, 16

Figure 7. Three dimensions of project goals
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Project management attempts to organize activities into five functions of
management: Planning, Organizing, Leadership, Control, and Change. “The practice of
project management pays attention to goal-oriented systems, subsystems, their
relationships, and environment; this is what makes project management a systems
approach to management” (Nicholas, 21). The planning function focuses on “setting
organizational goals and establishing means for achieving them consistent with available
resources and forces in the environment” (Nicholas, 19). In other words, the planning
process establishes “what needs to be done, how it has to be done, by whom, in what
order, for how much, and by when” (Nicholas, 160).
The Organizing function deals with three areas of responsibility. The first is to
train and manage personnel into a system of authority, responsibility, and accountability.
The second is to acquire and allocate facilities, materials, and capital. The final
responsibility is to organize the above into a suitable structure that includes policies
procedures, and communication channels (Nicholas, 19).
Leadership involves the direction and motivation of personnel to obtain
organizational goals. For most leaders, the influencing of individual or group
performance is a primary concern (Nicholas, 20).
Control represents the quality of the project. Performance measures of
effectiveness or efficiency are assessed and any corrective action is taken (Nicholas, 20).
Change simply encapsulates the dynamics involved in any major project. Change
can affect project schedules, goals, timetables, and/or responsibilities.
Within the Planning phase, an array of tools is used to help organize the work,
responsibilities, and goals within the project. These tools include: Work Breakdown
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Structure (WBS), the Responsibility Matrix, Key Events and Milestones, Gantt Charts,
networks, decision analysis, critical path analysis, cost estimating, budgeting, and
forecasting.
The purpose of the WBS is to “reduce the project into work elements that are so
clearly defined that they, individually, can be thoroughly and accurately defined,
budgeted, scheduled, and controlled” (Nicholas, 165). The level of breakdown is
dependent on the project and varies between projects. Figure 8 depicts the hierarchical
elements of a WBS (Nicholas, Figure 6-1, 166). These elements are broken down into
manageable pieces called work packages (Nicholas, 165). The level of decomposition is
not fixed and is dependent on the project definition and requirements.

Level
01
Project

1
01-01
Category

2

01-01-100
Task

3

01-01-1001
Subtask

4

5

01-02
Category
etc.

01-06
Category

Work
Package
01-06-100

01-06-200
Task

etc.

Work
Package
01-01-102

etc.

01-06-700
Task

01-06-701
Subtask

Work
Package
01-06-7011

etc.

Work
Package
01-06-7012

Source: Nicholas, 166

Figure 8. WBS Elements
The WBS organizes what needs to be done. By combining the WBS with a
structured organization chart the responsibility matrix is created (Nicholas, 175). This
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matrix or chart allows the management of work packages and by assigning responsibility
in an effective manner. Figure 9 depicts a simple responsibility matrix consisting of a
single work package and functional position (Nicholas, Figure 6-7, 175).

Project engineer

Project element or work package

Persons or positions responsible

Basic design

A

Responsibility Code
P Primary responsibility
S Secondary responsibility
N Must be notified
A Must give approval

Source: Nicholas, 175

Figure 9. Simple Responsibility Matrix

The responsibility matrix not only shows the level of the organization that is
responsible for a function, it also shows who or what will be impacted by a change in a
work package design or schedule. The matrix, combined with other tools, allows the
project manager to track effects of various changes in work packages on other work
packages, which may or may not be under the direct control of the manager of the work
package undergoing a plan change. Tracking these primary and secondary effects is
critical to identifying effects and benefits.
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Global Positioning System
The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a system nominally consisting of 24
military satellites that provide continues global positioning, navigation and timing
information (SMC, 1). These satellites transmit a signal that can be processed by a
receiver that then computes position, velocity, and time within an amount of error.
The error is caused by several factors. The space and atmospheric environments
account for most of the errors in GPS positioning since Selective Availability (SA) was
discontinued. SA is the intentional degradation incorporated into the civilian signal by
the military. SA was discontinued due to increasing civilian demand for more accurate
positioning and navigation information.
GPS provides two separate signal codes, the Precise Positioning Service (PPS)
and the Standard Positioning Service (SPS) (NAVSTAR, 1). The SPS signal
communicates on the C/A (Coarse Acquisition) code while the PPS signal communicates
on the P(Y) (Precise (encrypted) code. Table 5 details the PPS and SPS accuracy
indicated in the 1999 Federal Radionavigation Plan and the SPS Signal Specification
document.
Table 5. GPS Accuracy
SPS (SA off)

SPS (SA on)

PPS (Worst Case)

1999 FRP PPS (CJCS)

Horizontal Error

≤ 13 meters (SIS only)

≤ 100 meters (SIS only)

≤ 6.3 meters

≤ 22 meters (17.8 meters)

Vertical Error

≤ 22 meters (SIS only)

≤ 156 meters (SIS only)

≤ 13.6 meters

≤ 27.7 meters

40 Nanoseconds

340 Nanoseconds

20 Nanoseconds

Time Transfer Error

100 Nanoseconds

All statistics at 95% Confidence Interval: Actual position will be within the error listed above 95% of the time.

Sources: 1999 FRP, C-6; GPS SPS Signal Specifics, 15; NAVSTAR, 1; Chairmen, D-3; HQ AFSPC, 3-17
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The GPS is composed of three segments; a space segment (space vehicle(s)), a
control segment (ground stations) and a user segment (personnel or systems in the field)
(HQ AFSPC, 3, 1). The control segment consists of five Monitor Stations located in
Hawaii, Kwajalein, Ascension Island, Diego Garcia and Colorado Springs (NAVSTAR,
2). There are three ground antennas also located at Ascension Island, Diego Garcia, and
Kwajalien (NAVSTAR, 3). The Master Control Station (MCS) is located at Schriever
AFB. The monitor stations track all satellites in view, accumulate and process ranging
data to determine satellite orbits and to update each satellite's navigation message (Dias,
3). This updated information is then transmitted to each satellite via the Ground
Antennas. User segments then receiver position, velocity, and time information from the
space segment. Figure 10 depicts the interaction between these segments.
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Figure 10. The Global Positioning System
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The original purpose for GPS was to aide in the tracking of ballistic missiles.
Today, “the primary mission of the GPS is to provide precise, all-weather, threedimensional position, velocity and time (PVT) information to an unlimited number of
properly equipped military and civil users in the air and space and on the land and sea”
(HQ AFSPC, 1, 1). An additional mission of the Space Vehicle (SV) the GPS is attached
to is to provide national warning of nuclear detonations via the Nuclear Detonation
(NUDET) Detection System (NDS) (HQ AFSPC, 1, 1). The NDS is a complementary
payload on the GPS bus. However, for this research it is considered a separate system
that must be studied in a similar fashion. GPS is used by the military in peacetime and in
wartime operations.
GPS wartime navigation support applications include en route navigation,
low level navigation, target acquisition, close air support, missile
guidance, command and control, all-weather air drop, sensor
emplacement, precision survey, instrument approach, rendezvous,
coordinate bombing, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operations, search
and rescue, reconnaissance, range instrumentation, and mine
emplacement. GPS provides precise time transfer support to the
warfighter by synchronizing distributed and diverse battlefield sensors and
communications systems. (HQ AFSPC 1, 1)
In addition to the military, civil organizations, foreign organizations, and
individuals use the PVT information as well. Civilian and International use of GPS
makes GPS unique for a military system, as it is one of the few military system also used
by civilian and foreign organizations.
Civil navigation applications include intercontinental en route navigation,
vehicle monitoring, oceanic and coastal navigation, harbor operations,
resource exploration, hydrographic and geophysical surveying, position
reporting and monitoring, and coordinating search operations. The GPS
precise time transfer mission is vital to synchronizing a growing number
of distributed civil utilities including electrical, sewage, water and
telecommunications. (HQ AFSPC, 1, 2)
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GPS is operated by the Department of Defense (DoD) and managed by the
Interagency GPS Executive Board (IGEB) (HQ AFSPC, 1, 1). Figure 11 displays the
organizational structure of the IGEB (IGEB).
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Figure 11. GPS Management Structure
As indicated by Figure 11, the GPS military satellite constellation is managed by
an interagency organization that allows representation of the major users of GPS service.
As owner, operator, and maintainer of the GPS system, the Department of Defense
provides policy direction to USSPACECOM. USSPACECOM provides support to other
Unified CINCs and external user agencies via the 14th Air Force and the 50th Space Wing.
DoD assigned the GPS Support Center (GSC) as the lone focal point for operational
issues and military matters relating to GPS (GSC). Additionally, the GSC is US Space
Command’s interface to the US Coast Guard’s Navigation Center (NAVCEN) and
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Federal Aviation Administration’s National Operations Control Center (NOCC) (GSC).
The NAVCEN represents the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Civil GPS Service
Interface Committee depicted in Figure 11. This relationship structure is depicted in
Figure 12.
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Figure 12. GPS Command Organization Structure
The 1st Space Operations Squadron provides GPS support during launch, Low
Earth Orbit (LEO) transfer, and disposal phases (HQ AFSPC, 2, 4). The GSC and the 2nd
Space Operations Squadron are responsible for day-to-day command and control, space
segment maintenance, anomaly resolution, navigation and time transfer, nuclear
detonation detection missions of the GPS satellite constellation, and space support to
warfighters through GPS Performance Prediction and Mission Planning, and GPS
Enhanced Theater Support (HQ AFSPC, 2, 4). The GCS also interacts with the civil
users of GPS.
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III. MODELING AND ANALYSIS
Introduction
Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) requires a methodology to consider
modeling and measuring the military space. As the military services become increasingly
dependent on civil and commercial space systems for mission planning and situational
awareness of the battlefield, a methodology needs to be developed and understood
(AFDD 2-2, 14). Figure 13 outlines the proposed framework to aid in the determination
of the military worth of space and is further discussed in greater detail.
Determine Space
Missions and
Functions

Identify and Track
Space Mission, User,
And Organization
Responsibilities

Develop MOEs

Use Existing Model

Develop a new Model
Determine Model

Existing Model

Build a Model

Design of Experiments
Using Law & Kelton Modeling & Simulation
Analysis Study Step Approach
Simulate &
Analyze Results

Figure 13. Proposed Methodology
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Determination of Space Mission
The first step in determining the modeling of military space is to understand what
Space provides to military operations. This includes long-term and short-term impacts
space has on the warfighter and basic military operations during peacetime and in
wartime. Understanding what support, information, and functions a single space system
provides in every phase of operations is fundamental to modeling its use and
effectiveness. This information can be found in relevant Joint and Service level doctrine,
and Concept of Operations (CONOPS) documents. Research from service schools (Air
Command and Staff Collage, Air War College) and academic institutions can be
invaluable sources of information, highlighting the future of space missions. Doctrine is
essential for the determination of military effectiveness as mentioned in Chapter II. In
addition to specific doctrine, system experts, system users, System Program Offices, and
senior leadership guidance are areas for information of space system missions.
Each space system has a primary mission (or missions) for which it was built.
After a system is commissioned, secondary and tertiary missions are added as new uses
for a space system are discovered. These ancillary uses, while not initially intended when
the system was designed, must be considered when modeling the military system.
In order to capture the primary and ancillary missions of a space system a mission
organization format is required. The work breakdown structure (WBS), adapted from
project management, can be used to capture the interactions of a space system. The
mission of each of the space system segments may be viewed through a modified WBS; a
mission breakdown structure (MBS). This structure is similar to an organization chart
listing all the appropriate mission functions relating to the space system of interest.
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Ideally, every principle or material mission must be captured in this process in order to
model the space systems. Unfortunately, this might not be realistic as this process is
extremely time consuming and space systems are used at an increasing rate. Clearly,
critical missions must be identified and understood. Once these missions have been
identified, it becomes easier to highlight any interactions that exist between other systems
and users and what is required to be modeled. It is these interactions that help determine
the military effectiveness of the space system. It is a recommendation of this study that
such information be tracked and provided in a multiple classification level database.
Such data will ease the modeling of space assets and activities.
Tracking of Space Mission Users
The next step in the framework is to identify and track the various long-term and
short-term key users or user classes of the space systems using the MBS as a guide.
Again, due to the sheer volume of users, this may not be a realistic goal at the high
fidelity level. Identification of the effects of the space system on critical users is
necessary. Adapting the responsibility matrix from project management will allow
AFSPC to identify and track the critical and secondary users and missions a space system
supports. As the primary and ancillary missions grow, new users classes can be
identified and tracked, highlighting areas for continued study. By tracking both space
system missions and its users, an understanding of how space affects military operations
will be gained. By representing the interactions in an organized and thorough manner,
assessment of military effectiveness can be studied. This may help to identify important
interactions that can be further investigated. Recall that the military may not be the only
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user of a particular space system. Civilians, corporations, and many foreign countries use
the information provided by several U.S. space systems, not just the GPS example given
in Chapter I. The reliance on this information infrastructure by civilian institutions and
corporations is also important in determining military worth. The U.S. Military exists to
defend the United States and its people, which include its civilian infrastructure. When
considering the military worth of space, it may be relevant to measure the military worth
of civilian space systems and civilian use of military systems as well. Such information
should be organized into a database and kept up to date. As missions are added or
deleted, the mission breakdown structure with the primary and ancillary effects should be
tracked or examined inside the responsibility matrix. Any modeling and measurement of
military space will gain the knowledge of these interaction affects. Of course, as with all
modeling, it will be necessary to identify the key “drivers’ for the analysis under
consideration.
Develop Measures of Effectiveness
Classic Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) exist for most weapon systems in use
for military operations. Given increases in technology do these measures provide enough
insight into the interactions that they are meant to capture or are new measurements
needed? What is an appropriate measure for a space system, which provides
simultaneous global support to military and civilian users? What about long-term versus
short-term effects? These are difficult questions to answer and highlight the difficulty in
evaluating space systems. Surveying space-based information users to find out exactly
how space is used in completion of their mission aids in the development of appropriate
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measures of effectiveness. Another factor to consider is level of fidelity. Classic MOE,
such as Pk, are great at measuring high fidelity effects but what is lacking is lower fidelity
MOE that represents similar measures at an aggregate level. The development of proper
MOE’s for the level of fidelity required is a critical modeling and analysis issue.
Modeling
The next step in this framework is to demonstrate the worth of the space system
of interest using a representative model. As discussed in Chapter II, space is not well
represented above the system level in modeling and simulation. A reason for this is the
difficulty of aggregating the effects of space-based systems. The global influence
provided by space systems are currently measured only in local terms as represented in
system level models. This high fidelity modeling may not be appropriate for low fidelity
issues. A means of aggregating these high fidelity models into lower levels of fidelity is
needed.
First, armed with the necessary space system mission details and appropriate
MOE, an inspection can be performed of the current existing models available for
analysis. If a model exists that is suitable as a surrogate for the space system of interest
and is capable of providing the appropriate level of detail then it should be used.
However, if a model does not exist, it needs to be built. The modeling process itself is a
complex and difficult process and it is beneficial to use well-accepted techniques for
successful modeling. The recommended process for using modeling and simulation was
listed in Chapter II, Figure 4 (see Appendix A). A model does not need to be extremely
complex to be valid—simplicity is sometimes preferred (Ravindran, 3). To capture some
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of the effects of space, this intermediate step of modeling just the appropriate effects, is
an option to consider.
Space, while a complex environment, should only be modeled with the features
that are relevant. Unneeded complexity can be eliminated using the responsibility matrix
to further define the questions and problems to be modeled. The responsibility matrix
allows an analyst or decision maker to track the effects of changes in work packages on
the overall schedule as well as its effect on other work packages. In this case, the
responsibility matrix allows space operators to track the effects of changes in the primary
and ancillary missions of a space system, other systems and the users of the space
systems.
A complete up to date inventory of models and how space interacts in them is
required. A flexible plug and play simulation environment to measure effects and a
Verified, Validated, and Accredited model of both space and war that captures multiple
effects – primary, secondary, tertiary, and allows for short term and long term effects.
Design of Experiments
Once the primary and ancillary missions of a space system are understood and a
full identification of military operations utilizing military or civilian space-based
information is accomplished, an appropriate Design of Experiments (DOE) needs to be
defined in order to test the worth of a space system in regards to the issue at hand. A
DOE is necessary to properly control and evaluate any experimentation. The information
provided by the responsibility matrix allows us to make certain characterizations about
the system of interest that can then be tested using a design of experiments. “In most

44

real-life situations the experiment must be done under one or more constraints…Often a
trade-off must be sought between quality of information obtained and the time (or cost)
required to obtain it” (Murthy, 195). As previously mentioned, the level of information
required to determine the total effectiveness of a system may be unobtainable or require
too much time to collect to address the question in time for the issue at hand. The longterm and short-term effects global space systems provide to military operations may be
successfully modeled, but only after characterizations can be made and tested by
appropriate design of experiments. Questions and hypotheses should be developed about
the space system of interest and the various missions enabled by space. The appropriate
information and design of experiments should attempt to answer the questions about the
space system. AFSPC has provided some examples of questions they are interested in
answering.
• What synergistic effects do satellites provide to mission accomplishment and
how are these force multipliers measured?
• [How] Does the loss or degradation of space assets affect putting bombs on
target?
• How do we measure damage or degradation in satellite?
• At what point does satellite degradation start affecting mission effectiveness?
• At what points in the peace, pre-conflict, conflict, return to peace process is
space critical? (Whitsel, 2001)
Once characterizations about a space system can be made and appropriate
measures have been selected appropriate analysis can be accomplished to determine its
military effectiveness.
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As space systems often provide multiple primary and ancillary missions, ideally
each material mission would be evaluated in regard to the question at hand. If such a
review is infeasible, then critical missions must be reviewed. Each mission may have
different measures of effectiveness and a different population of users at various levels of
aggregation. In order to measure the total effect of a space system, mission studies may
have to be aggregated. The main task will be identifying and quantifying key “drivers”
of military worth and then aggregating this information to an appropriate level of fidelity.
Simulation and Analysis
Analysis of the results of the modeled space system should be accomplished using
the predefined experiment and valid statistical or analytical techniques. Due to the wide
range of space systems and mission uses, one technique may be preferable to another;
therefore any one technique is not recommended in this methodology. Instead, insistence
on the importance of valid analysis at the end of the study is required.
As a pilot example, the effectiveness of the GPS positioning data and its affect on
munitions accuracy will be modeled using GIANT in Chapter IV. The error associated
with GPS positioning, both for an airframe and a particular munitions, will be the subject
of this pilot study. Of particular interest, is how degradation of the GPS signal affects the
positioning error of both the GPS-guided launching airframe and the GPS-guided weapon
system? DOE will be used to determine significant interaction of these errors and their
effect on weapon lethality.
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IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Overview
The approach proposed in this thesis is applied to a pilot study of a facet of the
Global Positioning System (GPS) to illustrate the military effectiveness of the GPS.
While this approach will not capture all primary and secondary effects of GPS, it will
illustrate how data can be developed and tested for this purpose. This study will focus on
how the degradation or denial of a GPS signal affects a GPS-guided weapon. To carry
out a complete analysis of GPS, an aggregation of critical missions must be analyzed in a
similar fashion.
It should be noted, however, that to completely assess the military worth of GPS,
this process must be applied to all key aspects of the GPS mission (both short-term and
long-term), not just the single example provided here. Resources (time limitations, as
well as classification restrictions) have precluded such a complete analysis. The
illustrative example is provided not to completely evaluate the worth of GPS, but rather
to illustrate the concept.
Mission Breakdown Structure
The GPS mission, as represented in AFSPC’s GPS Concept of Operations (GPS
CONOPS) document, is to provide precise, all-weather, three-dimensional position,
velocity, and time (PVT) information to military and civil users in air, land, sea, or space
environments during peacetime and wartime operations. GPS uses in times of war
include: enroute navigation, low-level navigation, target acquisition, close air support,
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missile guidance, command and control, all-weather air drop, sensor emplacement,
precision survey, precision timing, instrument approach, rendezvous, coordinate
bombing, UAV/UCAV operations, search and rescue, intelligence gathering, and time
transfer. Additional wartime uses of GPS would include the same civil uses that are
carried out in times of peace. GPS fulfills a mission support or force enhancement role.
These roles are depicted in Figure 14. This chart, listing the mission functions provided
by GPS, was created from unclassified and open-source literature.
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Figure 14. GPS Supported User Segment Mission Breakdown Structure

Figure 15 depicts the mission of each segment in the GPS. The space segment
provides the navigation and timing information used by military, civilian, and
commercial sectors. The ground segment provides command and control, prediction, and
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maintenance of the satellite and navigation message. The user segment only receives and
processes data for mission use. For example, an F-15E GPS and Inertial Navigation
System (INS) guidance system or JDAM guidance package would fall under the user
segment. This chart was created from unclassified open-source literature. The secondary
GPS bus payload, the NUDET Detection System is not modeled within this research. As
a separate system, NDS must be similarly studied, but its interaction would be key in
capturing the total worth. In addition, in a larger study, all the other key military and
civilian uses (“drivers”) must be studied to adequately model the “worth” of GPS.
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Figure 15. GPS Segment Mission Breakdown Structure
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Responsibility Matrix
The responsibility matrix aids in understanding of the various interactions of the
GPS missions and the responsible organizations. Ideally, such matrices would be created
electronically and be maintained by the relevant organizations. Web-based, interoperable
model architecture will be required to organize such a database. Multi-level
classifications will also be needed if military and civilian users have access to this
database. To create the responsibility matrix, the mission breakdown structures are crossreferenced with the GPS organizational command structure found in AFSPC’s GPS
Concept of Operations document. A limited responsibility matrix is displayed in Figure
16. This chart gives a simple example for various types of platform. For example, the F15E airframe uses GPS Positioning and Velocity (Navigation) information for Navigation
as well as Timing data for information and data transfer to the on board weapons systems.
As mentioned in the previous chapters the responsibility matrix allows for the
tracking of effects on the mission caused by changes in the availability of the GPS
navigation and time message. Changes in timing or navigation information would have
limited effect on a civilian luxury sedan with onboard GPS navigation. The driver would
still be able to navigate provided they know the route or had a map. However, changes in
the positioning and timing information could have a serious effect on the Navy’s hightech AEGIS Class Destroyers. Changes in positioning data can also affect air platforms
and weapons delivery. The F-15E can deliver gravity bombs, which do not require GPS
information, however, changes in GPS information can affect the position of the F-15E at
weapons release, which indirectly transfers the position error to the gravity bomb.

50

GPS User Segment
Miltary Uses

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X

Sea
P
Exx latform
on V
s
alde
z

X
X
X

Lan
d
Mer Platfor
m
ced
es G s
PS

X
X
X

Air
Pla
Boe tforms
ing
777
GPS
/INS

Sea
P
AGI latform
SC
lass s
De s
troy
e

X
X
X

We
ap
Mk- on Sys
84 J
t
DAM ems

Lan
d
M-1 Platfor
m
A2
ABR s
AM
S

Space Segment
Navigation Message
Ephemeris & Clock Data
Ground Segment
Navigation Performance
Satellite Maintenance
Anomaly Resolution
Selective Availability
Anti-Spoofing
Ephemeris & Clock Prediction
User Segment
Positioning
Velocity
Timing

Air
Pla
F-1 tforms
5E
GPS
/INS

GPS Mission Breakdown Structure

r

Nav
igat
ion

Civil Uses

X
X

Source: Open-source literature

Figure 16. Limited GPS Responsibility Matrix

Measures of Effectiveness
The literature review provided the relevant unclassified information to illustrate
the mission breakdown structure (MBS) and responsibility matrix for the use of GPSprovided navigation information in an operational short-term wartime environment. This
mission organization process was then used to aid in the determination of the military
worth of GPS in an operational mission setting using the appropriate measures of
effectiveness (MOE). The MOEs chosen for this pilot analysis were the circular error
probable (CEP), horizontal 1-sigma error, and Pk. CEP is the radius of a circle centered
at the true target location of which a certain percentage (i) of measured impacts fall. CEP
is used for horizontal accuracy using the following formula at various levels of
confidence is:
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CEPi = σ − 2 ln(1 − i )

where i is the level of confidence desired and σ is the horizontal 1-sigma error
(GIANT, Veridian). These are classic measures that are commonly accepted by the
operator community and used in the Joint Munition Effectiveness Manuals (JMEMs) to
assess weapon effectiveness.
GIANT Scenario
As an illustrative example of one aspect of the type of analysis that must be
undertaken, the operational wartime mission of GPS is modeled in GIANT. To
determine the effects GPS has on an operational mission, GIANT was used to model the
flight route of a Joint Directed Attack Munitions (JDAM) weapon and the F-15E
airframe. Due to its extensive usage during the prosecution of the war on terrorists in
Afghanistan and its subsequent procurement increases, Joint Directed Attack Munitions
(JDAM) was selected as the specific weapon to be modeled. To model JDAM accuracy,
an adequate launch platform is required. The F-15E was chosen for a launch platform
because it was readily available within the model selected for analysis.
There are three major sources of GPS related error for the weapon. The first
would be the initial GPS-derived position and velocity error provided by the launching
platform, in this case the F-15E. A second source of error derives from the GPS-based
guidance and control systems on the JDAM itself. A final source of error derives from
the geometry of the GPS constellation relative to the user, which varies with time.
The primary focus of this pilot research is on the overall accuracy of the weapon
system. The F-15E platform is only modeled to develop the initial position and velocity
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error associated with weapons release, which is a result of the F-15E’s GPS/INS drift
error. Ideally, an appropriate random process would represent the drift error; however,
the F-15E guidance system drift error is classified. While this data could be illustrated
with a uniform or triangular distribution, it would be more precise to use the actual drift.
For the purpose of this illustration such classified numbers were unnecessary. Further,
the drift error is dependent on whether or not GPS is available. If GPS were available,
then the guidance accuracy would be within 6.3 meters or less as listed in HQ AFSPC
GPS Concept of Operations. If GPS were not available, then the drift error will grow no
greater than 0.8 nautical miles per second as specified by Litton’s guidance and control
system (LN-94 Second Generation F-15 INU) for the F-15E (Litton).
A final potential source of error is enemy jamming of the GPS signal. Jamming
degrades the GPS signal strength, making it more difficult for GPS receivers to acquire
the GPS signal. These Jammers come in a variety of sizes and power outputs from a 1watt hand-portable jammer to a 1000-watt vehicle-mounted jammer (Veridian). Due to
classification issues and the large variety of existing jammers, jammers werel not
specifically modeled. As a surrogate, the GPS signal strength itself will be degraded.
Degradation can occur from space environmental weather, atmospheric conditions and
signal jamming. A jammer has the effect of reducing GPS signal strength so directly
modifying the signal strength will have a similar effect. If this scenario were expanded
beyond this limited example, local GPS jammers would need to be modeled.
Several input factors must be considered before a valid scenario can be simulated.
Veridian Engineering of Dayton, Ohio supplied the GIANT model and some notional
input data. In addition, the Naval Air Warfare Weapons Division (NAWCWPNS),

53

GPS/INS Branch provided ephemeris data for GPS Week 129, 13-19 February 2002.
This data is used to determine position and velocity of the GPS satellites over the
specified time period. Table 6 provides the relevant data chosen as input into the GIANT
scenario.
Table 6. GIANT Scenario Input Data
Model Input
SV Signal

Data Used
28 MHz on L1 C/A, 10 %
increments
25 MHz on L1 P(Y)
22 MHz on L2 P(Y)

Remarks

Satellitethesis.SIG

MEO Constellation

Provided by
Naval Air Warfare
Weapons Division
(NAWCWPNS)

Week 129 ephemeris data
UERE
Terrain
SSPD
Munition
Body Masking
GPS Antenna
GPS Receiver
Inertial Navigation
System (INS)
Platform
Target Laydown
Control
Routes
Attrition
Target Weapon
Allocation
Hand-off

File Name

Not user created, supplied
with model
North East Asia Terrain
JDAM Pk calculations based
on target CEP
Circular Error Sigma
Target Location: 6 Meters
Weapon Guidance: 2 Meters
F-15 & JDAM Body Mask
Files
GAS7 ANEFS for F-15
Generic FRPA for JDAMs
GemIII receiver for F-15
JDAM receiver for JDAM
EGI F-15 INS
JDAM INS
F-15E Launcher Platform
JDAM-Mk84 Weapon
Platform
Lat: 38.666, Long: 125.8333
Initial Ephemeris time 3600
seconds

New_Week0129.MEO

Supplied by Veridian
Supplied by Veridian
Supplied by Veridian

NEA.TER
Wpn012Tgt0001.SSPD
JDAM.MUN

Supplied by Veridian

F-15 & JDAM. Body

Supplied by Veridian

GAS7.ANEFS
Installed.FRPA
GEMIII.REC
JDAM.REC
EGI.INS
JDAM.INS

Supplied by Veridian

Supplied by Veridian
Supplied by Veridian
Supplied by Veridian

F-15E.PTF
JDAM.PTF
Thesis.TGT
Thesis.CASE

Route #1 is Launcher Route
Route #2 is Weapon Route
Zero attrition applied, no
threats modeled
1 weapon per attack and 1
weapon per target

Thesis.ROUTELIST
EADSIM data can be
input for platform attrition

Thesis.ATTR.GNT
Thesis.DMPI.GNT

Random Distribution for
Thesis.HANDOFF
Initial Position Error
Source: Veridian, GIANT Users Manual, GIANT Analysts Manual

Random Distribution
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Design of Experiments
The signal strength of the L1 C/A frequency was degraded by 10 percent
increments to 50 percent. This was sufficient for simulating various jammers of
increasing signal strength. Table 7 presents this design of experiments (DOE)
graphically. The factors in this pilot study will then be tested for differences in the mean
at the α = 0.05 level.
Table 7. Design of Experiment
2-Factors

Initial Degradation

Degrade After Weapons Release

6-Levels
No Initial degrade
10% Initial Degrade
20% Initial Degrade
30% Initial Degrade
40% Initial Degrade
50% Initial Degrade
No Degrade After Release
10% Degrade After Release
20% Degrade After Release
30% Degrade After Release
40% Degrade After Release
50% Degrade After Release

The formal hypothesis test used during this process uses the “paired observation”
approach mentioned in Hartman’s High Resolution Combat Modeling. “Let Zi be output
MOE from n1 independent replications of scenario 1 and let Yi be the same MOE from
the n2 independent replications of scenario 2. If n1 = n2, then the paired observation
approach can be used” (Hartman, 2-28). Xi = Zi = Yi for i = 1, 2, …, 30. For large Xi,
scenario 1 was better, for small Xi, the scenarios were about the same. The confidence
interval for population means, CI = X ± t (n − 1,1 − α / 2) S 2 / n , can be used to gain
information on the differences in scenarios. If the CI contains zero then there is no
significant difference between the two scenarios. A CI greater than zero it implies
scenario 1 is better. A CI of less than zero implies scenario 2 is better. This approach is
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used for every confidence interval except when sample sizes are not the same. Means
comparison for different sample sizes is used in this case.
GIANT was used to model the drift error and subsequent initial weapon release
error. Using the F-15E as a launching platform, a bombing route was simulated with 30
replications. Each replication start time was increased by one hour to account for normal
fluctuations in daily Dilution of Precision (DOP) error. DOP is the normal fluctuation in
GPS position error due to satellite placement in the sky. If the satellites are too low or
too high in the horizon, GPS error coverage area increases in size. This is displayed in
Figure 17. For minimum GPS error (lowest DOP) a user needs one satellite directly
overhead and three spaced about 120-degrees apart near the user’s horizon. As the GPS
satellites move in their orbits throughout the day, changes to DOP are expected.
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Figure 17. GPS Dilution of Precision
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Results
During the simulation, GIANT creates a weapon handoff file that contains the
horizontal and vertical position, velocity, and time errors associated with a weapons
release. The horizontal error measured by GIANT is the difference between the Desired
Mean Point of Impact (DMPI) and the actual impact point. This is referred to in GIANT
as the Horizontal 1-Sigma error. Table 8 displays the resulting 95% confidence interval
about the mean horizontal 1-sigma error.
Table 8. 95% Confidence Interval for the Mean Horizontal Error
Scenario

Average

Standard

95% Confidence Interval

Deviation

Half-Width

Min

Max

# Of
Observations

No Degrade

1.90

0.24

0.09

1.46

2.30

30

10 % (Low) Degrade

3.13

2.79

1.04

1.63

13.50

30

Outliers

243.00
(3.33)

731.00 (2.53)

273.00 (1.0)

1.66
(1.66)

2400.00
(12.40)

30 (27)

30% (Med) Degrade

722.00

1090.00

407.00

2.19

2400.00

30

40% Degrade

2200.00

192.00

72.90

2010.00

2400.00

30

50% (High) Degrade

2200.00

192.00

72.90

2010.00

2400.00

30

20% Degrade (w/o

The 10 and 20 percent degradation scenarios were almost identical, with the
exception of 3 data points for the 20% scenario. The 10% increase in GPS signal degrade
was not enough to adversely affect the ability to receive the GPS signal. These data
points were determined to be statistical outliers. If those three data points are deleted and
a means comparison test for different sample sizes is used there is no statistically
significant difference between the means of the 10% scenario and the 20% scenario at the
α = 0.05 level. This is displayed in Table 9. Testing was accomplished by creating a
confidence interval on the difference in the observed results of the two scenarios as
required when comparing two different simulation situations (Hartman, 2-28). A
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comparison of two scenarios that result in a confidence interval that contains zero is
considered to be not statistical different.
Table 9. Means Comparison Test
Scenario
10% vs 20%
10% vs 20%
(minus outliers)

Difference in Means (X2-X1)
239.87

T(n1+n2-2, α)
2.011739

Lower Bound
239.35

Upper Bound
240.39

0.20

2.0141033

-0.334

0.734

In addition, the last two scenarios, 40% and 50%, show no difference in
degradation. This is due to simulated thresholds for GPS and INS accuracy within
GIANT. When a GPS signal is unavailable, GIANT uses modeled INS drift error to
calculate position location. This INS drift error is used until a GPS signal is acquired. If
GPS is never reacquired then the position error continues to grow based on the INS drift
error. Therefore in the 40% and 50% scenario, GPS signal is unavailable to the GPS
receiver onboard the F-15E and INS drift error is used to obtain position information.
As a result of the analysis of the initial handoff error, the original design factors of
degrading GPS in 10% decrements was reduced from six to four factors: no, low (10%),
medium (30%), and high (50%) degradation. This is represented in Table 10 as before
each factor will be tested to determine if there is any difference in the means at the α =
0.05 level. The resulting horizontal handoff error is displayed in Figure 18. This handoff
error is used as the initial weapon system error upon release from the launch platform
Table 10. Reduced Design of Experiment
2-Factors

Initial Degrade

Degrade After Weapons Release

6-Levels
No Initial degrade
Low (10%) Initial Degrade
Med (30%) Initial Degrade
High (50%) Initial Degrade
No Degrade After Release
Low (10%) Degrade After Release
Med (30%) Degrade After Release
High (50%) Degrade After Release
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Initial Weapon Hand-off Error
10000

Lognormal Unit of Distance

1000

No Initial Degrade
Low Initial Degrade
Medium Initial Degrade
High Initial Degrade

100

10

69
77
69 239
77 33
69 275
77 84
69 311
77 8
4
69 347
77 33
69 383
77 84
69 419
77 84
69 455
77 84
69 491
77 84
69 52
77 784
69 563
77 84
69 599
77 84
69 635
77 84
69 671
77 84
69 707
77 84
69 74
77 38
4
69 779
77 84
8
69 15
77 84
69 851
77 84
69 887
77 84
69 923
77 84
69 95
77 98
4
69 995
78 84
69 031
78 84
69 067
78 84
69 103
78 84
69 139
78 84
69 17
78 58
4
69 211
78 84
69 247
78 84
28
38
4

1

GPS Time (Seconds)

Figure 18. Limited Horizontal Hand-off Error

Figure 18 contains a series of 4 lines graphed. These lines are based on the
horizontal handoff error points for each modeled scenario and are connected to depict the
variation in error…. The bottom-most line, No Initial Degrade, represents the horizontal
accuracy error of the F-15E when no degradation in GPS signal is present. This position
error is transferred to the munition upon weapon release. For the No and Low Initial
Degrade scenarios, horizontal error is minimally affected and in fact are not statistically
different at the α = 0.05 level. However, in the Medium Initial Degrade scenario,
fluctuations in position accuracy can be seen. This is due to the Dilution of Precision
(DOP) mentioned earlier. These normal fluctuations are exaggerated when the satellite
signal strength is degraded. This implies that Medium Initial Degrade provides
additional error to the expected normal position errors.
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Figure 19 displays the initial error in terms of CEP at the 50% level and Figure 20
displays the CEP at the 95% level. This indicates that 50% and 95% of the outcomes,
respectively, will fall within the indicated radius. As would be expected, the CEP at the
50% level is more closely grouped than at the 95% level. If no degrade was experienced
during the F-15E’s flight, its true location would be expected to fall inside the central
region of both graphs 50% and 95% of the time respectively. Minor fluctuations are seen
with low degradation and larger fluctuations are seen with medium degradation. At high
GPS degradation the CEP radius expands out to an approximately 2400 unit of distance
radius. However, even at the 95% level, the CEP is still within 10 meters for the No
Degradation and Low Degradation scenarios.
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Figure 19. 50% CEP at Hand-off
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Figure 20. 95% CEP at Hand-off

Figure 19 and 20 indicate that when low or medium degradation of GPS is likely,
time of day is a major factor in hand-off accuracy as seen in the fluctuations on the graph
in this pilot study. Due to DOP and reduced GPS signal strength, some variance in
weapon accuracy is expected. Under high degradation, time of day or satellite position
has less impact on weapon accuracy, as the GPS signal is effectively unavailable. Of
course, directional consideration and jammer placement will need to be considered in an
actual test case of jammer effects.
Weapon modeling runs were accomplished using the handoff errors described
above for initial error upon free-fall of the weapon. The released JDAM was modeled in
GIANT against a stationary target. The four levels of satellite signal degradation were
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then used to measure the error in weapon accuracy. This was accomplished by
subtracting the initial handoff error. Table 11 provides initial analysis on the horizontal
1-sigma and 95% CEP weapon error. As GPS is degraded, accuracy decreases as initially
expected. However, degradation after weapon release has a greater impact on weapon
accuracy in this pilot study. Figure 21 displays this horizontal 1-sigma weapon error
increase graphically. This is the difference in the true target location or desired mean
point of impact (DMPI) and the actual point of impact.
Table 11. Weapon Position Error Scenario Results
Initial GPS Degrade
No Degrade
Low Degrade
Medium Degrade
High Degrade

No Degrade
Horizontal
CEP(95%)
Error
6.43
15.74
7.29
17.84
690.00
1688.95
2160.00
5287.13

GPS Degrade After Weapons Release
Low Degrade
Medium Degrade
Horizontal
Horizontal
CEP(95%)
CEP(95%)
Error
Error
5.71
13.98
646.00
1581.24
6.06
14.83
646.00
1581.24
667.00
1632.65
667.00
1632.65
2160.00
5287.13
2160.00
5287.13

High Degrade
Horizontal
CEP(95%)
Error
2317.39
5672.38
2318.62
5675.4
2320.52
5680.05
2226.27
5449.35

Horizontal 1-Sigma Weapon Error

10000

Lognormal Unit of Distance

1000

100

10

No Initial Degrade
Low Initial Degrade
Med Initial Degrade
High Initial Degrade

1
No Degrade

Low Degrade

Med Degrade

Degrade After Weapon Release

Figure 21. Horizontal 1-Sigma Weapon Error
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High Degrade

As displayed in Figure 21, it appears that No and Low Degrade scenarios do not
adversely affect weapon accuracy. However, upon medium degradation of the GPS
signal after weapon release, the No and Low Degrade scenario’s accuracy decreases
significantly. It should be noted that improved GPS signal after weapon release cannot
compensate for the initial error as indicated by the Medium and High Degrade scenarios.
While the JDAM does have control surfaces, these are small and unable to compensate
for a great deal of error. The length and time of weapon descent also plays a factor.
To test the hypotheses on Figure 21, the differences in scenarios were compared
and confidence intervals created at the α = 0.05 level (Hartman, 2-28). Table 12 provides
data for each scenario to include: mean, standard deviation, and half-width, at the 95%
level of confidence.
Table 12. Scenario Confidence Intervals
X1

X2

No
Low
Med
High
No
Low
Med
High
No
Low
Med
High
No
Low
Med
High

No
No
No
No
Low
Low
Low
Low
Med
Med
Med
Med
High
High
High
High

Mean

Std Dev

Half-Width

Min

Max

# of Obs

6.43
7.29
690.00
2160.00
5.71
6.06
667.00
2160.00
646.00
646.00
667.00
2160.00
2320.00
2320.00
2320.00
2230.00

0.41
2.37
1080.00
441.00
1.57
1.61
1070.00
446.00
1060.00
1060.00
1070.00
446.00
450.00
450.00
443.00
187.00

0.15
0.89
413.00
162.00
0.59
0.60
401.00
167.00
389.00
389.00
401.00
167.00
171.00
171.00
165.00
69.70

4.45
4.45
6.68
6.68
1.06
1.06
6.68
6.68
6.68
6.68
6.74
6.74
6.68
6.68
6.74
2030.00

6.83
15.20
2410.00
2410.00
6.68
10.70
2410.00
2410.00
2410.00
2410.00
2410.00
2410.00
2410.00
2410.00
2410.00
2410.00

30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
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Table 13 provides a summary of the means comparison tests on the significance
of the difference of each modeled scenario. Reading this table, one can see that there is
no statistical significance between No and Low Degrade scenarios at the α = 0.05 level.
However, there is a statistically significant difference between the No/Low Degrade
scenario and each of the Medium and High Degrade scenarios at the α = 0.05 level.

Table 13. Scenario Statistical Significance
Significance of Degrade Scenarios (α = 0.05)
No
Low
Med
High
No
Low
Med
High

No Significant Difference
No Significant Difference
No Significant Difference

The other measure of interest is the probability of kill or Pk. Table 14 displays the
expected Pk for each scenario while Figure 22 displays this graphically for each run.
Again the chart depicts Initial Degrade against Degrade After Weapon Release. Within
GIANT, a P(k) below 80 % requires additional weapons on target to reach a level of
confidence on target destruction.
Table 14. Modeled Weapon System Pk
Initial GPS Degrade No Degrade Low Degrade Medium Degrade High Degrade
0.80
0.80
0.51
0.04
No Degrade
0.78
0.78
0.51
0.04
Low Degrade
0.51
0.51
0.51
0.04
Medium Degrade
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.01
High Degrade

As indicated in Table 14 and displayed in Figure 22, GPS availability has a major
impact on weapon lethality. As the degradation after weapons release increases, Pk
decreases. No Initial Degrade Pk is around 80% with little or no fluctuation until
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degraded to the medium level. Upon high degradation, all scenarios’ Pk drops to
approximately zero.

Modeled Weapon P(k)
0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6

High Initial Degrade
Medium Initial Degrade
Low Initial Degrade
No Initial Degrade

P(k)

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0
No
Degrade

Low
Degrade

Medium
Degrade

High
Degrade

Degrade After Weapon Release

Figure 22. Weapon Pk

While it has been shown that GPS availability, or the lack thereof, can affect
weapon performance (e.g., accuracy and lethality), a more detailed analysis must be
performed to understand how initial degradation and GPS availability after weapon
release affect weapon accuracy. With the available data, response surface methodology
(RSM) can be employed to help understand the interactions of Initial Degrade and
Degrade after Weapon Release on horizontal 1-sigma weapon error. Initial experiments
with fitting the results to a predictable model indicated no interaction between the No
Degrade scenario and the Low Degrade scenario as was witnessed in the figures and
tables above. Therefore, the No Degrade scenario was removed. The resulting scenarios
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offer a two-factor, three-level design of experiments (DOE). Table 15 displays the
design factors and levels for the DOE. “RSM is useful for analyzing problems in which
several independent variables influence a dependent variable” (Montgomery, 445). Of
course, the goal of RSM is to optimize the response. For this research effort, RSM is
used to explain the modeled results and their interaction and demonstrate another possible
analysis.
Table 15. Design of Experiments
Factors
-1
0
1
-1
Degrade After Weapons Release 0
1
Initial Degrade

Levels
Low Degrade
Medium Degrade
High Degrade
Low Degrade
Medium Degrade
High Degrade

Due to nonlinear interactions discovered in the initial experiment, a second-order
model was fitted using SAS JMPin 4.0.2 (Academic) statistical software. Figure 23
summarizes the results of the JMPin analysis. By analyzing these outputs, an
understanding can be gained regarding the interactions of our two factors and weapon
accuracy. The first significant result is gleaned from the R-square value. This value
represents the overall appropriateness of the model at explaining the variability in the
data. At 0.73, this fitted model explains a large percentage of the variability at least in
the pilot study. While there appears to be an extremely high mean square error (MSE)
this is due, in part, to the scale of the data. Because our unit of distance range as shown
in Table 12 goes from 6.68 to 2410.00, our MSE was rather large. To confirm this
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scaling issue, multiplying the data by 0.001 dropped the MSE from 2822755 to 2.82275
with no change to R-square or F-values.
Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.729651
0.724531
0.601054
1.246432
270

Lack Of Fit
Source
Lack Of Fit
Pure Error
Total Error

DF Sum of Squares Mean Square
3
261
264

8.468264
86.905830
95.374094

2.82275
0.33297

F Ratio
8.4774
Prob > F
<.0001
Max RSq
0.7537

Effect Tests
Source

Nparm

Initial Degrade
Degrade After Weapon Release
Initial Degrade*Degrade After Weapon Release
Initial Degrade*Initial Degrade
Degrade After Weapon Release*Degrade After Weapon Release

1
1
1
1
1

DF Sum of Squares
1
1
1
1
1

63.079210
81.365951
37.690525
62.964028
12.308015

F Ratio

Prob > F

174.6062
225.2248
104.3292
174.2874
34.0692

<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001

Figure 23. RSM Results Obtained from JMPin
Reviewing the p-values provided in Figure 23, we see that the two main effects
(Initial Degrade and Degrade After Weapons Release) significantly change (p-value <
0.05) the horizontal 1-sigma weapon error. In addition, the interaction effects also
significantly change the horizontal 1-sigma weapon error.
The validity of the model at predicting the interaction of Initial Degrade and
Degrade After Weapons Release would not be comprehensive if the residuals were not
normally distributed. The residuals are the difference between the observed value and the
predicted value (Neter, 25). It is important to plot the residuals and check for normality
to validate the fitted model because normality was an assumption required by this
technique. The results of this normality confirmation are listed in Figure 24. While the
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residuals are not exactly normally distributed, the moderate departures from normality do
not imply a lack of model validity (Montgomery, 86). In Figure 24, there is slight
departure from normality. However, for this size of samples it is not significant.
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Figure 24. Residual Distribution Plot
After the model validation process, the model can be used for predictions. The
fitted model is a quadratic relation. “It is unlikely that a polynomial model will be a
reasonable approximation of the true functional relationship over the entire space of the
independent variables, but in a relatively small region they usually work quite well”
(Montgomery, 446). As proven earlier, the model is a good fit over our limited data set.
This may not be true for an expanded example; however, similar analysis might yield an
improved model. The model parameter estimates are displayed in Table 16 and the
resulting model is given below and is graphically displayed in Figure 25.
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Table 16. Parameter Estimates
Parameter Estimates
Term

Estimate Std Error

Intercept
Initial Degrade
Degrade After Weapon Release
Initial Degrade*Degrade After Weapon Release
Initial Degrade*Initial Degrade
Degrade After Weapon Release*Degrade After Weapon Release

0.261553
0.5919798
0.672334
-0.560435
1.0244025
0.4529167

0.081793
0.0448
0.0448
0.054868
0.077596
0.077596

t Ratio Prob>|t|
3.20
13.21
15.01
-10.21
13.20
5.84

0.0016
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001

Y =β 0 + β 1 X 1 + β 2 X 2 − β 3 X 1 X 2 + β 4 X 12 + β 5 X 22
Y =261.55 + 591.98 X 1 + 672.33 X 2 − 560.44 X 1 X 2 + 1024.40 X 12 + 452.92 X 22
Horizontal 1- Sigma Weapon Error

After Weapon Release

0
Initial Degrade

Figure 25. Response Surface for Horizontal 1-Sigma Weapons Error

For this modeled scenario, this equation can be used to determine the predicted
horizontal weapon error given a particular degrade scenario. For example, if during
mission planning it is discovered that medium GPS degradation can be expected in
theater and low GPS degradation is anticipated at or near the target, the level effects
provided in Table 15 can be used to predict weapon accuracy.
X1 = Medium = 0, X2 = Low = -1, Y = 42.2 units of distance error
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Of course, this equation is based on the small, illustrative example and does not
include other elements such as error caused by wind or direction and placement of GPS
signal jammers. The approach, however, could be applied to a much larger example.
Ideally, if this were done for every key drift effecter, a predictive measurement could be
developed that could then apply space-based effects of GPS to JMEM.
Overall Findings
It is clear from this research effort that the lack of GPS can adversely affect the
accuracy of a JDAM weapon. Minor GPS signal degradation should not significantly
decrease accuracy if it occurs prior to weapon release or during weapon freefall due to
small initial error and freefall geometry. Minor GPS signal degradation would be created
by small handheld or vehicle-mounted jammers with a small signal strength output (1-10
watts). With larger jammers, weapon accuracy will be affected adversely whether it
occurs during weapon freefall or before weapon release. If GPS degradation affects
weapon handoff, unguided weapons will be off course before or upon release. As these
gravity bombs have little to no guidance or error correction capability, the error will only
grow as it falls based on its speed and trajectory.
If an adversary or ally chooses to jam the GPS signal, the signal is jammed for all
receivers within range of the jammer, affecting both adversary and allied receivers. This
is an important concept to understand when determining whether GPS degradation may
occur in the area of operations. A less technologically advanced country like Afghanistan
does not use GPS for military operations and might be expected to use GPS jamming to
deny its use to its adversaries. In contrast, the intentional degradation of GPS by a more
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technologically advanced country may be less likely as they may use GPS for military
and civil operations. There are other less superior methods used for navigation and
positioning. Both Russia and China have positioning systems, however, at the opensource level of information it is unclear whether Russia’s system is inferior or technically
equal to our GPS system. It may be possible to jam our signal while maintaining the use
of their system. To more completely model GPS in this environment, directional
jammers should be incorporated along with different types of guided and unguided
munitions against both stationary and moving targets. Also the number of replications
should be increased to not only simulate longer operations windows but to develop
tighter levels of confidence in output analysis.
As measured, for this small facet of the GPS, military effectiveness can be
modeled by the number of sorties required to ensure target destruction. Increasing
degrade on the GPS signal would have the effect of increasing the number of aircraft
sorties flown against a particular target as the probability of kill decreased as jamming
increased. However, this measure may not directly translate into a total military
effectiveness for GPS. After this process has been accomplished for every critical use of
GPS, a method of aggregation will be required to determine the total effectiveness of
GPS.

71

V. CONCLUSIONS

Introduction
This chapter reviews the importance of this research as well as the major issues
covered during this research. The major findings of the literature are also summarized.
This is followed by a review of the results of efforts to assess the issues in modeling the
effectiveness of space. The chapter concludes with recommendations for future research
relating to this topic.
Literature Review Findings
Joint space doctrine does not officially exist. As a result, clear official direction
to operators is unavailable. As military doctrine is the foundation of determining military
effectiveness or worth, it is difficult to assess space’s worth and therefore to evaluate
modeling space. In the absence of joint doctrine, AFSPC has developed space doctrine to
provide Air Force operational direction and establish responsibilities. With the recent
selection of General Lance Lord as AFSPC/CC, the Space Commission’s opinion that
AFSPC become the DOD executive agent for space appear to have been approved. With
other recent developments, such as the President’s decision to withdraw the U.S. from the
1972 ABM Treaty, space may be transitioning from a support function to an operational
function similar to airpower’s transformation after World War I.
Specific models with required levels of fidelity for comprehensive space
modeling is not complete. Available models contain large gaps in representation. Figure
6 in Chapter II provided a visual representation of the issue of level of fidelity in space
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modeling. Current mission and system level models, those at a high level of fidelity, do a
good job at representing the aspects of space. The theater and campaign level models,
those at a low level of fidelity, do a poor job of representing the aspects of space. What
is required is a method of aggregating the representation of space aspects in high fidelity
models into intermediate and lower level fidelity models.
Relevance of the Research
The DOD is relying on space for operational mission support at an everincreasing rate. If this reliance on space is not understood, the U.S. and its national
security become more vulnerable to operational degradation and mission failure as the
result of space information degradation or denial. This thesis attempts to identify a
framework in organizing the interactions and responsibilities among space systems,
system owner/operators, and space-based information users. These are all necessary
steps in accurately modeling space.
Recommendations for Future Research
Space is clearly not well represented in the various theater level models as
outlined in Chapter II. However, as Chapter IV illustrates, space is better represented in
some system-level or high fidelity models and simulations. What is missing is a way of
aggregating that high fidelity information into the theater level models. In addition, is the
theater or campaign level models valid for measuring the military worth of space or does
a Global level model need to be created? Missing is appropriate measures for
determining spaces’ global military worth. What is the ultimate measure of a battle or a
campaign? Is winning a Pyric victory winning? Is a military “win” that results in a
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political loss a victory? What is the measure of a conflict deterred because of
information superiority?
As was seen in the illustrative example, the classical measures used to relate space
worth to the warfighter, may not directly measure the military worth of space. A clear
understanding of the space missions and those impacted by space is required before any
further research can be accomplished in measuring the military worth of space. Future
studies should use the proposed process in this thesis to gain insight into the other critical
missions supported by space-based systems. This is required, regardless of the level of
fidelity. A method of aggregating this system level model detail into theater or campaign
level models is a complex but necessary task.
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APPENDIX A. SIMULATION STUDY DETAILS (LAW, 84-86)
.
1. Formulate the problem and plan the study.

a. Problem of interest is stated by manager.
b. One or more kickoff meetings for the study are conducted, with the project
manager, the simulation analysts, and the subject-matter experts (SMEs)
in attendance. The following issues are discussed:
• Overall objectives of the study
• Specific questions to be answered by the study
• Performance measures that will be used to evaluate the efficacy of
different system configurations
• Scope of the model
• System configurations to be modeled
• Software to be used
• Time frame for the study and the required resources
2. Collect data and define model.

a. Collect information on the system layout and operation procedures.
• No single person or document is sufficient
• Some people may have inaccurate information—make sure that true
SMEs are identified
• Operating procedures may not be formalized
b. Collect data (if possible) to specify model parameters and input
probability distributions.
c. Delineate the above information and date in an “assumptions document,”
which is the conceptual model.
d. Collect data (if possible) on the performance of the existing system (for
validation purposes in step 6).
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e. The level of model detail should depend on the following:
• Project objectives
• Performance measures
• Data availability
• Credibility concerns
• Computer constraints
• Opinions of SMEs
• Time and money constraints
f. There need not be a one-to-one correspondence between each element of
the model and the corresponding element of the system.
g. Interact with the manager (and other key project personnel) on a regular
basis.
3. Is the conceptual model valid?

a. Perform a structured walk-through of the conceptual model using the
assumptions document before an audience of managers, analysts, and
SMEs.
• Helps ensure that the model’s assumptions are correct and complete
• Promotes ownership of the model
• Takes place before programming begins to avoid significant
reprogramming later.
4. Construct a computer program and verify.

a. Program the model in a programming language or in simulation software.
Benefits of using a programming language are that once one is often
known, they have a low purchase cost, and they may result in a smaller
model executions time. The use of simulation software, on the other hand,
reduces programming time and results in a lower project cost.
b. Verify (debug) the simulation computer program.
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5. Make pilot runs.

a. Make pilot runs for validation purposes in Step 6.
6. Is the programmed model valid?

a. If there is an existing system, then compare model and system
performance measures for the existing system.
b. Regardless of whether there is an existing system, the simulation analysts
and SMEs should review the model for correctness.
c. Use sensitivity analysis to determine what model factors have significant
impact on performance measures and, thus, have to be modeled carefully.
7. Design experiments.

a. Specify the following for each system configuration of interest:
• Length of each run
• Length of the warmup period, if one is appropriate
• Number of independent simulation runs using different random
numbers—facilitates construction of confidence intervals
8. Make production runs.

a. Production runs are made for use in Step 9.
9. Analyze output data.

a. Two major objectives in analyzing output data are:
• Determining the absolute performance of certain system configurations
• Comparing alternative system configurations in a relative sense
10. Document, present, and use results.

a. Document assumptions, computer program, and study’s result for use in
the current and future projects.
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b. Present study’s results.
• Use animation to communicate model to managers and other people
who are not familiar with all of the model details.
• Discuss model building and validation process to promote credibility.
c. Results are used in decision-making process if they are both valid and
credible.
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APPENDIX B. SPACE, MISSILE DEFENSE, & IO M&S CATALOG

The following information was provided by MAJ Bill McLagan of USSPACECOM/AN
and is dated 1 August 2001.
Advanced Real-Time Gaming Universal Simulation (ARGUS): ARGUS models the
offensive and defensive ballistic missile environment from strategic to tactical ballistic
missile attack. It is used to analyze C2 structures for the future national missile defense
system. Will be replaced by WARGAME 2000.
POC JNTF, Maj Joe Moles, 719-567-9931

Advanced Regional Exploratory System (ARES): ARES is being developed as the
Army’s new theater campaign analysis model. ARES is an event-driven, deterministic,
variable resolution, object-oriented simulation that will support analysis of
joint/combined land, air and maritime force operations, including force sufficiency and
OPLAN testing in a wide range of potential threat and operational conditions, such as
multi-sided, and/or, nonlinear-combat environments. ARES supports information
operations analyses by emphasizing information flow from sensors over communications
paths to command and control nodes. ARES supports the use of ground truth or
perception modes of operation. While ground truth mode uses perfect knowledge of the
battlespace, perception mode limits each decision-maker to only that information his/her
unit’s organic sensors have collected and any information reported by subordinate and
superior units and then fuses that information into a battlespace view unique to that
particular command node. ARES uses “effectors” to support sensitivity analyses on the
effects of destruction, disruption, or exploitation of command, control, communications
and intelligence nodes and associated assets. ARES will offer three mechanisms for
modeling command & control: a) the use of rulebases for automated command &
control, currently representing a reactive control process; b) scripted OPLAN/OPORD
scenarios or c) a combination of rulebase and scripted C2.
POC USALIWA, Mr. Berlin Lewis, bklewi2@vulcan.belvoir.army.mil, 703-681-6359 or USACAA, Mr. Wally
Chandler, chandler@caa.army.mil, 301-295-1692

Adversary: Adversary is a communications network-modeling tool used to analyze
communication infrastructures and then convey the results of analyses in graphic format.
It uses an editable baseline and point-and-click analytic processes displayed on an
OILSTOCK map. Adversary provides a usable set of tools for both effective support to
military planning/targeting assessment and SIGINT target development and cataloging.
POC NSA, Adversary PMO, 301-688-6570

Arena: This application acts as an arena within which information operations models,
simulations and data are integrated. Arena presents an integrated view of various
command and control aspects including electronic warfare, communications structure and
performance, targeting, command and control structure and national infrastructure.
POC JIOC, Mr. Larry Whatley, larry.whatley@jioc.osis.gov, 202-977-4758
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Battle Area Regions Threatened (BART): BART is a PC-based, graphical strategic
ballistic missile defense analysis model designed to estimate the number of ground-based
interceptor shoot-look-shoot opportunities and other engagement characteristics.
POC NORAD, Dr. Murray Dixson, murray.dixson@peterson.af.mil, 719-554-3781
Builder: The Interactive Scenario Builder models the electromagnetic environment and
allows the user to create deterministic scenarios as a mission-planning tool. Radar beams
and coverage using various propagation models are displayed on a DTED map and the
effects of terrain masking visualized. The effects of radar jamming also can be displayed.
With the Aurora feature, communications links and networks can be visualized. An RF
coverage visualization tool shows the energy being radiated by a transmitter.
Communications receiver coverage allows the user to analyze what would happen if you
tried to jam a communications link.
POC NRL, (Radars) Dr. Larry Schuette, schuette@nrl.navy.mil, (202) 767-6814
POC NIWA, (Communications) Rosemary Wenchel, wenchell@niwa.navy.mil, (202) 767-1493

C2W Analysis and Targeting Tool (CATT): CATT provides a simulation capability of
an adversary's Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) and the capability for analysts to
do sensitivity analysis on alternative actions. It includes end-to-end modeling of IADS
processes such as detection, tracking, weapons allocation, communication, decisionmaking and engagement. The model's primary C2W actions include inserting and
removing various user defined flight paths and removing various communications links
and radar posts.
POC AFIWC/SAA, LtCol Ross Ziegenhorn, raziege@afiwc.osis.gov, 210-977-2427

C4ISR Model: The C4ISR Model is a federation of five interacting simulations used to
integrate C4ISR and combat operations in analysis of joint force campaigns. The five
models are combat, command and control, sensor, communications assessment and
information.
POC DISA/D83, Carroll Mitchell, 703-696-9181

C4ISR, Space and Missile Operations Simulation (COSMOS): COSMOS has been
developed to support analysis of the performance of C4ISR, space and missile systems.
COSMOS explicitly models collection systems for SIGINT, IMINT and HUMINT as
well as surveillance systems using visible, IR, LADAR and RADAR technologies. The
resources and associated timelines required to process, exploit and disseminate the
collected information are modeled using a flexible rule-based approach. COSMOS can
also model systems in all Space Command mission areas including futuristic US and
foreign space control systems such as Space-Based Lasers (SBL), Ground-Based Lasers
(GBL) and Kinetic Energy ASATs (KEASAT). The model is currently in use
supporting OSD, Joint Staff, Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine, Office of the Space
Architect and classified customer analyses. COSMOS has been interfaced with
community accepted classified models to support analysis of current and future system
architecture performance. Versions of the toolset are available on SUN, Silicon Graphics
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and TAC-3 workstations. COSMOS was developed and continues to be enhanced by the
SAIC Pentagon On Site Team (POST).
POC Jeff Knox, SAIC 703 276-2116 JEFFREY.S.KNOX@saic.com

Communications Jamming Model (COMJAM): COMJAM is part of AFIWC's
Improved Many on Many (IMOM) family of programs to model electronic combat
scenarios. COMJAM's main purpose is to predict jamming effectiveness against the
communications capabilities of both ground-based and airborne communications assets.
The primary nodes of analysis are network, link and transmission rings analysis.
POC AFIWC/SAV, Capt Keith Harrington, kjharri@afiwc.osis.gov, 210-977-2706

Communications Modeling Tool (CNMTE): CNMTE is a tool designed to construct,
model and analyze traffic for telecommunications networks. It provides a means to
combine the network subscriber to the physical network and simulate traffic between
subscribers. Simulation results present a picture of the network over time and answer
such questions as how many calls were sent and received? What is the probability of
calls being blocked? What is message delay? And what percent of bandwidth is used?
CNMTE is applicable to network analysis for offense or defense.
POC JIOC, Mr. Lawrence Whatley, larry.whatley@jioc.osis.gov, 210-977-4758

EDGE Developer Option: EDGE Developer Option is a commercial off-the-shelf set of
visualization, simulation and analysis tools and applications that allow you to create a
rich synthetic environment and view the world from outer space to sea level. The
foundation is the EDO Visualization Component. Additional components provide
libraries for integrating imagery, maps, terrain, time and weather. The Ascent tool for
launch vehicle trajectory simulation component can also run as a stand-alone
program.http://www.autometric.com
Extended Air Defense System (EADSIM): EADSIM is a system-level simulation used
by combat developers, materiel developers and operational commanders to assess the
effectiveness of theater missile defense (TMD) and air defense systems against the full
spectrum of extended air defense threats. EADSIM models fixed- and rotary-wing
aircraft, tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, infrared and radar sensors, satellites,
command and control structures, sensor and communications jammers, communications
networks and devices, and fire support in a dynamic environment which includes the
effects of terrain and attrition on the outcome of the battle. The tool provides analysts
and training audiences insights into TMD architecture, battle management, system
employment for maximum effectiveness, force structure analysis and mission planning.
POC Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Mr. Jim Watkins, jim.watkins@smdc.army.mil, 256-9551681

Extended Air Defense Testbed (EADTB): EADTB allows the analyst to model a broad
range of military missile defense applications from the fire unit level to the theater level
in a constructive simulation framework. Its object-based simulation architecture supports
this range by allowing the user to develop system models called specific system
representations, or SSRs. The user/analyst can place numbers of these tailored simulated
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systems on a host game board without having to rewrite other existing systems models or
modify the supporting architecture. A major strength of EADTB is the capability to
model the BMC4I to the level necessary to answer complicated joint service
interoperability issues. EADTB has obtained DIS compatibility and is pursuing HLA
compliance at this time. BMDO has certified EADTB as Y2K compliant.
POC Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Mr. Moody Parsons, parsonsg@smdc.army.mil

Global Positioning System End-to-End Model (GLEEM): GLEEM was developed to
assist in analysis of capabilities and vulnerabilities of Global Positioning Systems/Inertial
Navigation Systems (GPS/INS) in aircraft and guided munitions. GLEEM allows
projection of GPS receiver performance in signal lock maintenance while in a hostile or
benign environment and simulates various combinations of antennas and receivers, on
multiple platforms, with multiple jammers. Friendly interference platforms can be
included as well.
POC AFIWC/SAV, Lt Michael Perry, mjperry@afiwc.osis.gov, 210-977-2706

GPS Interference and Navigation Tool (GIANT): GPS Interference And Navigation
Tool (GIANT): GIANT is a constructive and repeatable engagement/mission level
simulation that calculates the impact of navigation performance on warfighter measures
of effectiveness (e.g., Target Kills). A GIANT scenario consists of a GPS/INS-equipped
platform moving over digital terrain (i.e., DTED) on a WGS-84 earth under a moving
GPS constellation transmitting multiple codes on multiple frequencies. GIANT can
represent any air or ground vehicle with or without weapons. Weapons also have
GPS/INS navigation systems and the launch platform to weapon handoff event is
modeled. As an option, any number of stationary or moving GPS jammers can be present.
Target miss distance and probability of kill is thus traceable to the weapon and the
launcher. Many measures of performance and time histories are calculated and output.
GIANT has been used to support numerous Navwar and EW studies, is validated,
accredited, and included in the AFSAT.
POC SMC/CZE, Capt Trent Causey, joseph.causey@losangeles.af.mil, 310-3632937
Guardian: Guardian provides visualization and analysis of space system and
architecture susceptibility to counterspace threats. Guardian supports modeling of radiofrequency (RF) jamming, air-, ground-, and space-based laser phenomenologies, high
power microwave threats, and direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) systems. Guardian has
the capability to model the interruption of system commanding, target imaging, and data
download to ground stations. Guardian has been used to explore the effects of jamming
uplink communications of commercial satellite architectures.
POC: USAF/SMC/XR

Information Operations Navigator (ION): ION provides its users a standardized,
structured methodology for generating the IO portions of an OPLAN in Joint Operational
Planning and Execution System (JOPES) format and for identifying IO targets for a
Candidate Master Target List. ION is based on strategies-to-task methodology to derive
IO objectives from overall CINC objectives. The user identifies the effects IO must
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induce on an adversary in order to accomplish the IO objectives, and this information is
used to write the corresponding IO tasks.
POC JIOC, Ms. Regina Walker, regina.walker@jioc.osis.gov, 210-977-2911

Integrated Modeling and Analysis Suite (IMAS): IMAS models missile launches to
determine origin and threat. It is used to develop inputs for Integrated Theater Warning
and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) end-to-end system integrity tests.
POC NORAD/USSPACECOM/J6C, Mr. Ron Stephens, ronald.stephens@peterson.af.mil, 719-554-9704

Joint Simulation System (JSIMS): JSIMS is the next generation simulation for joint
training and exercises, replacing the Aggregate Level Simulation Protocol (ALSP) Joint
Training Confederation (JTC). JSIMS provides the object-oriented environment and
common services, such as databases, security protocols, a High-Level Architecture
(HLA) compliant environment, and interfaces to real-world C4ISR systems, that the
Services will populate with representations of their units and weapons systems. Each
Service has reoriented its next-generation training simulation effort into populating
JSIMS with the relevant objects. JSIMS Service components include the Warfighter
Simulation 2000 (WARSIM 2000) for the Army, the National Air and Space [Warfare]
Model (NASM) for the Air Force, JSIMS Maritime for the Navy and Marine Corps, the
National Systems Simulation (NATSIM) for the National Reconnaissance Office, the
WARSIM Intelligence Module (WIM) for tactical intelligence, and the Joint SIGINT
Simulation (J-SIGSIM) for national signals intelligence. DISA is the Executive Agent
for C4ISR systems simulation, and DIA is responsible for foreign systems performance
and behavior. JSIMS IOC is set for Apr 2001, and FOC for Dec 2003. http://www.jsims.mil
Joint Warfare System (JWARS): JWARS is under development to be a state-of-theart, constructive simulation that provides a multi-sided and balanced representation of
joint theater warfare capable of use in analysis of planning and execution, force
assessment, system effectiveness and trade-off analysis, and concept and doctrine
development and assessment. It will be a balanced warfare representation including C4,
ISR and logistics and will focus on the operational level of war. It will replace MIDAS
and TACWAR. The Limited IOC version is due in Mar 2000, Full IOC in May 2001 and
FOC in FY 2002. http://www.dtic.mil/jwars
Laser Threat Analysis System (LTAS): LTAS is a comprehensive computer modeling
and simulation environment for assessing the operational impact of optical directed
energy weapons and countermeasures. LTAS encompasses the solution spectrum from
physical process models through comprehensive threat engagement models.
POC AFIWC/SAA, Jack Labo, jalabo@afiwc.osis.gov, 210-977-2427

Missile Defense Space Tool (MDST), formerly Portable Space Model (PSM): MDST
provides the capability to support live and/or simulated exercises by injecting missile
warning message sets into operational communications and simulation networks. MDST
contains real time models designed to provide a representation of the Defense Support
Program, the Satellite Based Infrared System (SBIRS), and elements of the Theater Event
System at a sufficient level of fidelity to support exercises while operating in real time. It
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provides theater commanders notification of theater ballistic missile launches via the
Tactical Information Broadcast System (TIBS) and the Tactical Related Applications
Data Dissemination System (TDDS).
http://www.jntf.ssd.mil/bmdssc/PSM/PSM_SW_Spec.htm

Model for Analysis of Sensor Coverage (MASC): A Windows-based application for
computing the terrain-masked line-of-sight (LOS) coverage of ground, air and spacebased sensors. Ground-based and airborne sensor coverage can be displayed in 2 and 3D
while satellite LOS coverage is displayed as a 2D map.
POC NORAD, Dr. Murray Dixson, murray.dixson@peterson.af.mil, 719-554-3781

National Air & Space Model (NASM): NASM is the Air Force component of the Joint
Simulation System (JSIMS). It is the successor to the Air Warfare Simulation (AWSIM).
NASM is developing the mission space objects (systems, organizations and procedures)
JSIMS will use to provide the functional capability to represent the full range of
aerospace power applications in a joint synthetic battle space for both Air Force specific
and joint training. Applications include training and readiness, education, doctrine
development, situation assessment and the formulation, assessment and rehearsal of
operational plans. The IOC version of NASM will likely include a limited depiction of
all satellites (basic orbital characteristics) and higher fidelity models of missile warning
(DSP & SBIRS), navigation (GPS), some satellite communications and foreign space
control. By FOC the goal is to have fully integrated air and space in NASM & JSIMS.
Version 1 (IOC) will be released March 2002 and the Air Force Full transition (AFFT)
release will be September 2003 http://www.wg.hanscom.af.mil/NASM/overview.html
Naval Simulation System (NSS): NSS is an object-oriented, multiple-warfare and
Monte Carlo simulation system. NSS is also High Level Architecture (HLA) compliant.
It represents command and control, communications, computer, intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance (C4ISR) processes and systems in a fully integrated and
comprehensive fashion. This representation of C4ISR processes and systems specifically
addresses: command structures and relationships; representation of operational plans;
simulation of plan execution, including dynamic/responsive asset allocations; tactical
picture generation; dissemination of surveillance products; and simulation of surveillance
and intelligence product generation.
POC Navy, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR)

NORAD Air Defense Model (NADM): NADM is a PC-based, graphical strategic air
defense simulation designed to estimate the outcomes of battles using specified threat
scenarios and air defense architectures. Used in NORAD analyses and to support cruise
missile defense analyses and exercises.
POC NORAD, Dr. Murray Dixson, murray.dixson@peterson.af.mil, 719-554-3781

NORAD/USSPACECOM Communications Simulation System (NUCSS): NUCSS
replicates the communications string of the missile-warning component of Integrated
Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA). The model is maintained to reflect
the current operational ITW/AA configuration. It provides a performance audit of the
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current ITW/AA system under different threat scenarios and stress events such as
link/node outages and degradation of the communications links, provides a method to
evaluate technical development of the system and to improve its performance and
provides a road map for incorporating future mission capabilities into the ITW/AA
communications system. The simulation is able to federate under High Level
Architecture with other models.
POC NORAD, Dr. Roy Mitchell, roy.mitchell@peterson.af.mil, 719-554-3718

Personal Computer Fighter Intercept Boundary (PCFIB) Model: PCFIB is a PCbased, graphical air sovereignty analysis model designed to determine intercept
opportunities and locations for specified threats, surveillance systems, air bases, and
interceptors. PCFIB is used to assess the air sovereignty effectiveness of force
architecture.
POC NORAD, Dr. Murray Dixson, murray.dixson@peterson.af.mil, 719-554-3781

Radio Frequency Mission Planner (RFMP): RFMP provides the ability to evaluate
jamming mission success for communications links. RFMP is a DII-COE GCCS-M
software program that provides a visualization of RF propagation. RFMP integrates
environmental variables and communication hardware statistics with RF propagation
models to produce images that display geographical areas promoting RF
reception/transmission/detection for use in mission planning. By providing an interactive
and visual environment, RFMP allows the operator to develop familiarity with the RF
environment before a mission occurs by playing a variety of what-if scenarios.
POC NIWA, Mr. Ernest Anastasi, anastasi@niwa.navy.mil, (202) 767-1493

Satellite & Missile Analysis Tool (SMAT): SMAT is a comprehensive 2-dimensional
and 3-dimensional animated visual modeling tool for analysis of orbiting bodies, ballistic
missile trajectories, and their relationship to the Earth. SMAT provides a fully modeled
Earth with detailed geographic and political boundaries, has the capability to zoom and
rotate the viewing position of the Earth, and provides accurate Sun position and
illumination. Databases within SMAT contain the parameters for the Tactical
Warning/Attack Assessment system, the Air Force Satellite Control Network, and the
Space Surveillance Network sensors. SMAT allows complete control of all displayed
sensor parameters, both ground and space-based, and allows importing, editing and
saving of additional sensor parameters. SMAT provides the capability to model ballistic
missile launch profiles, both strategic and theater, from any point on the surface of the
Earth.
POC: Ms. Kathy Gue, USAF/SWC/DOG (Space Warfare Center) kathleen.gue@swc.schriever.af.mil

Satellite Navigation Accuracy Prediction Model (SNAPM): SNAPM was built to
evaluate Global Positioning System (GPS) accuracy as a function of constellation
geometry, equipment status and natural environmental events. The model is suitable for
real-time evaluation of changing conditions experienced in a tactical warfighting
environment. SNAPM represents all system components and elements that affect GPS
user accuracy and availability. Applications include scenario evaluation/development,
missile attack planning, aircraft operations planning and training. When used as a
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mission simulation tool, SNAPM allows the viewing of collective information pertinent
for evaluating and planning tactical decisions such as sortie timing, attack locations and
other offensive/defensive measures. SNAPM output is presented on a workstation screen
with colored hard copy available. SNAPM has been modified to run in a real-time
constructive simulation environment, in both DIS and HLA environments, providing
simulated GPS accuracies to other simulated systems. This instantiation of SNAPM also
includes the ability to consider the impacts of GPS signal jamming/spoofing and weather
effects.
POC USSPACECOM, Mr. Dave Peck, william.peck@peterson.af.mil

Satellite Tool Kit (STK): STK 4.0 (basic) is a free commercial off-the-shelf product
that provides sophisticated modeling functions for space- and ground-based objects, such
as satellites, ships, aircraft and land vehicles. Functions included in the free version of
the software include vehicle propagation, determining visibility areas and times and
computing sensor-pointing angles. Free STK provides animation capabilities and a twodimensional map background for visualizing the paths of vehicles over time. Results can
be generated in both textual and graphical formats. Additional modules can be purchased
to provide enhanced computational and visualization capabilities. In particular, STK's
Visualization Option (STK/VO) provides dynamic three-dimensional display of STK
scenarios. A host of additional modules are available to provide detailed analyses for
such tasks as determining satellite coverage over time, visibility related accesses for
networks of objects, rapid analysis of close encounters between orbiting objects, realistic
missile flight modeling, detailed modeling of radar systems and satellite communications
link analysis. It addresses mission planning, launch and ballistic missile flight. STK is
used to examine alternative deployments of satellites within constellations and analyze
alternative coverage of combinations of satellites.
POC Analytical Graphics, Inc., Mr. Doug Claffey, 610-578-1080 or 1-800-220-4STK

Sensor Platform Allocation Tool (SPAAT): SPAAT is an ISR force structure analysis
tool. It is a mixed integer program to select sensor architectures based on target coverage
and cost constraints. SPAAT is used to determine the optimal mix of sensors and
platforms required to accomplish the reconnaissance and surveillance mission. This
optimization fits in the overall picture of the OODA (observe, orient, decide and act) loop
at the orient/decide phase. ISR optimization bounds the feasible region of the trade
space. An ISR mix that produces improved battle space knowledge can be fed into
campaign or mission models to illustrate/quantify the military worth of ISR.
POC: Maj Mark Hunter, USAF/AFSAA

Space Command Optimization Utility Tool (SCOUT): SCOUT is a Mixed Integer
Program utilizing Goal Programming to solve a Capital Budgeting problem. The model
produces an investment roadmap: a mix of concepts, current systems, and launches that
maximizes both task coverage and military value while adhering to constraints on budget,
launcher demand, launcher availability, and logic governing the relationships of systems.
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Spacecraft Simulation Toolkit (SST): The SST is an advanced, flexible development
environment for the modeling of spacecraft and their environment. The SST is based
upon state-of-the-art simulation methods and accurate physical phenomenology. It’s an
object-oriented system consisting of software objects, which simulate the various systems
and subsystems of the physical spacecraft. The toolkit provides the ability to integrate
the software objects together into a simulation of either a complete spacecraft system or a
spacecraft subsystem. The SST uses visual programming to allow the user access to
spacecraft system, payload or subsystem models through pull-down menus and their
connection into control structures required to implement a simulation. The SST software
objects provide algorithmic simulation of the various spacecraft functions. The
simulation databases provide the necessary knowledge base within which the detailed
characteristics of the system are described as well as an orderly and efficient means to
store the results of a simulation for additional analysis. The interactive environment also
provides integrated data analysis, software development tools and DIS interfaces with
HLA interfaces currently under development. A key feature of the SST is its flexibility
to be reconfigured to meet a wide variety of requirements in engineering, simulation,
operations and training. Simulations that have been or are being developed include: Ultra
Lightweight Imaging Technology Experiment (UltraLITE), Space-Based Radar (SBR)
AMTI/GMTI, Global Positioning System (GPS), Hyperspectral Imaging (HSI),
Advanced Geosynchronous Studies (AGS) and the Next Generation Space Telescope
(NGST).
POC Air Force Research Laboratory, Dr. Rich de Jonckheere, rich.dejonckheere@vs.afrl.af.mil, 505-8465054

Spectral and In-band Radiometric Imaging of Targets and Scenes (SPIRITS):
SPIRITS is used to support electronic combat (EC) analysis, EC weapon effectiveness,
aircraft-weapon-sensor acquisition, research, test and evaluation, tactics development,
mission planning and training. SPIRITS is a simulation model used to scientifically
predict the infrared signature of an aircraft under many operational conditions. SPIRITS
simulates the emission of IR radiation due to the exhaust plume, hot parts, aerodynamic
heating, reflected radiation due to sunshine, earthshine, cloud shine and the atmosphere.
Outputs provided are in-band radiant intensity, spectral radiant intensity and a spatial
radiance map.
POC AFIWC/DBE, Mr. Larry Oakes, 210-977-2057

Strategic and Theater Attack Modeling Process (STAMP): STAMP is a ballistic
missile and space launch vehicle flight generator and engineering analysis tool. It can
model missile flights from launch to impact and present extensive flight characteristics
and trajectory descriptions using a wide array of graphical and tabular outputs. STAMP
can also model numerous US and foreign space launch vehicles from launch to orbital
insertion. STAMP features an easy-to-use operator interface using windows and clicktype menu selections. STAMP is driven by detailed engineering data bases, developed
and approved by the appropriate intelligence agencies, which contain the parameters and
values needed to model strategic and theater missiles as well as foreign space launch
vehicles consistent with intelligence estimates. Portions of STAMP have been integrated
into the Satellite and Missile Analysis Tool (SMAT) to generate and process foreign
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missile trajectories for SMAT users. STAMP was developed by SAIC under the
sponsorship of the Air Force National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC).
Strategic and Theater Operations Research Model (STORM): This simulation, the
Synthetic Theater Operations Research Model (STORM), will support in-depth analysis
of the campaign-level contributions of air and space power. It will provide a robust
analytical capability to evaluate the contributions of air and space power in the context of
military operations extended in time and space -- i.e., at the campaign level. Accordingly,
NASM/AN is developing STORM, a multi-sided, object-oriented, stochastic computer
simulation of military operations across the air, space, land, and maritime domains. The
simulation is being designed and built expressly to examine issues involving the utility
and effectiveness of air and space power in a theater-level, joint warfighting context. In
addition, the NASM/AN Program exchanges modeling and computer science expertise
with the training simulation community (NASM) and other Service and Joint analytical
efforts, promoting the DoD goals of interoperability and re-use. Designed to capitalize on
advances in both hardware and software environments, STORM is envisioned as a standalone tool as well as a member of a federation. As a direct result of the development of
STORM, the NASM/AN Program will provide NASM and the DoD M&S community at
large with authoritative representations (objects) of air and space power in a campaign
perspective. IOC delivery of version 1.0 is December 2002.
POC USAF/AFSAA http://www.s3i.com/STORM

System Effectiveness Analysis Simulation (SEAS)2: The System Effectiveness
Analysis Simulation (SEAS) is a PC-hosted, many-on-many, stochastic, theater-wide,
multi-mission-level model. It is typically used for military utility analyses of present and
future space systems to explore combat outcome sensitivities to C4ISR (Command,
Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance)
operational concepts and force structures. By modeling the explicit causal link from
sensor-to-shooter, SEAS is able to show the emergent non-linear behavioral impact of
C4ISR on spatial/temporal maneuver and attrition of terrestrial forces. SEAS 2 is a
mission model in the AF analysis toolkit (AFSAT) at
http://www.xo.hq.af.mil/xoc/xoca/afsat
POC: Capt Eric Frisco (USAF/SMC/XRDM) Eric.Frisco@losangeles.af.mil

Tactical Sensor Planner (TSP): TSP models electronic warfare effects. TSP
graphically displays the EC environment to include order-of-battle, the effects of stand
off jamming and self-protection jamming and the detection capabilities of ground-based
radars. Routes can be generated within TSP and color-coding the analysis points along
the route shows an analysis of the flight routing. The model displays line-of-sight (LOS)
between threat location and target aircraft flying at any altitude. Terrain masking effects,
engagement envelope limits and radar parametrics condition the LOS.
POC AFIWC/SAS, TSgt Justin Bolton, jwbolto@afiwc.osis.gov, 210-977-2729

Thunder: THUNDER is a stochastic, two-sided, analytical simulation of campaign-level
military operations developed in the 1980s under the auspices of the Air Force Studies
and Analyses Agency (AFSAA). The simulation was designed and built expressly to
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examine issues involving the utility and effectiveness of air and space power in a theaterlevel, joint warfare context. It provides insight into the full range of potential outcomes of
a military campaign. THUNDER's ground war combat results were derived from
deterministic play of US Army Concepts and Analysis Agency supplied data using the
attrition calibration (ATCAL) process. THUNDER is a data driven model. Scenarios,
force structure, terrain, and weapon systems are described in input data. Emphasis is
placed on traceability of data back to intelligence/service documents or lower level model
outcomes. THUNDER is a stochastic model, which supports Monte Carlo simulation and
statistical inference. Thunder is a campaign model in the AF analysis toolkit (AFSAT) at
http://www.xo.hq.af.mil/xoc/xoca/afsat
Model manager, Capt Thuan Tran (USAF/AFSAA) thunder.modelmgr@pentagon.af.mil

Target Prioritization for Links & Nodes (TPT-LN) {Formerly SIAM): TPT-LN
analyzes information flows on the battlefield to determine effects-based target priorities
and information degradation from weapon use. It models a network of sensors and
shooters and the paths that connect them. It displays communications paths, identifies
choke points, prioritizes targets, analyzes strategies/courses of action, and identifies
intelligence collection shortfalls. It is an automated decision support tool to assess
system vulnerabilities and plan for effective employment of air and space forces at the
JTF and JFACC. TPT-LN assists in ranking both terrestrial and space targets to produce
an integrated Candidate Target List (CTL) and assessing the value of information to both
Red and Blue commanders.
POC Capt Brett Johnson USAF/SWC/DOY

Warning: Warning is a PC-based, graphical strategic ballistic missile warning analysis
model designed to estimate warning time available to specified targets from launches
made from specified geographic areas. Its outputs can be interpreted as the probability
that missiles fired from a particular area were detected and reported.
POC NORAD, Dr. Murray Dixson, murray.dixson@peterson.af.mil, 719-554-3781

______________________________________________________________________
Please send catalog additions and updates to MAJ Bill McLagan, USSPACECOM/AN,
719-554-5122, DSN 692-5122, bill.mclagan@peterson.af.mil
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